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Evolution of conditions and criteria 
in!the last decade
Quentin Michel
University of Liège, Belgium
The EU trade control system dedicated a provision to criteria 
and conditions from its first set of legislation. The objective was to 
enhance common understanding and implementation by Member 
States’ licensing authorities. It shall be recalled that the EU has not 
adopted one trade control system implemented by one single EU 
authority, but its legislation consists of an attempt to coordinate 
Member States’ trade control systems. 
The first set of legislation was an unusual mix of a legally 
binding act in the form of a Council Regulation1, and a politically 
binding act in the form of a Council Joint Action2, with cross-
references between the two documents. The Regulation defined 
principles governing the export of dual-use items and the Joint 
Action adopted lists of items and criteria. 
Article 8 of the Regulation obligated Member States’ authorities 
to take into consideration the common guidelines set out in Annex III 
to Decision 94/942/CFSP when considering whether or not to grant 
an export authorisation. The term “guidelines” has to be assimilated 
to criteria rather than conditions, as the Council Joint Action was 
referring to factors to be considered and not to elements to be ful-
filled by the end-user to obtain the authorisation. Four categories 
of criteria were listed in the Joint Action: 
 – Member States’ commitments under international agreements 
on non-proliferation and the control of sensitive goods;
1 Council Regulation (EC) No 3381/94 of 19 December 1994 setting up a Community 
regime for the control of exports of dual-use goods OJ L 367, 31.12.1994, P. 1–7.
2 Council Decision (94/942/CFSP) of 19 December 1994 on the Joint Action adopted 
by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty on European Union concerning 




 – Member States’ obligations under sanctions imposed by the 
UN Security Council or agreed in other international fora;
 – Considerations of national foreign and security policy includ-
ing, where relevant, those covered by the criteria agreed at 
the European Council in Luxembourg in June 1991 and in 
Lisbon in June 1992 with regard to the export of conventional 
weapons;
 – Considerations about intended end-use risk of diversion.
In 1994, twelve States were members of the European Union 
and all were parties of the same international trade control regimes. 
It could therefore be expected that they shared and considered the 
same set of criteria concerning the granting of authorisations. It is 
interesting to note that two export conditions became indirectly 
compulsory for all Member States due to the ratification of certain 
international treaties. 
The first is a general commitment taken from the CWC, the 
BWC and the NPT, which prohibits the transfer of chemical, bio-
logical and nuclear weapons to a third State3.
The second is the commitment to grant an export authori-
sation for certain nuclear material only if the State end-user had 
signed and implemented a safeguards agreement with the IAEA4. 
A similar analysis could be made for some conditions 
requested by international trade control regimes like the NSG, 
the Australia Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement, the MTCR 
and the Zangger Committee as long as all EU Member States are 
parties to those regimes. 
For example, the NSG has adopted two conditions that consist 
of formal governmental assurances from the recipient State. The 
first should explicitly exclude uses which could result in any nuclear 
3 It shall be recalled that ownership of WMD is prohibited by those treaties except for 
nuclear weapons, which !ve States have the right to hold under certain conditions, 
including a disarmament commitment.
4 Article III.2 NPT.
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explosive device before transferring certain nuclear items5. The 
second concerns the retransfer of items or the transfer of listed 
items derived from facilities originally transferred by the supplier, 
where the same assurances as those required by the original transfer 
will be required for the new recipient6. The MTCR has adopted 
similar conditions consisting in formal assurance concerning the 
modification of the use of transferred and retransferred items7.  
In June 2000, the EU trade control system was replaced by one 
single Regulation that directly integrated the criteria of the Joint 
Action8. The list of criteria has remained similar: 
A. the obligations and commitments they have each accepted 
as a member of the relevant international non-proliferation 
regimes and export control arrangements, or by ratification 
of relevant international treaties;
B. their obligations under sanctions imposed by a common posi-
tion or a joint action adopted by the Council or by a decision 
of the OSCE or by a binding resolution of the Security Council 
of the United Nations;
C. considerations of national foreign and security policy, includ-
ing those covered by the European Union Code of Conduct 
on arms exports;
D. considerations about intended end-use and the risk of 
diversion.9
5 Paragraph 2 of INFCIRC/254. Part I.
6 Paragraph 9 of INFCIRC/254. Part I.
7 Article 5 of the MTCR Guidelines: “5. Where the transfer could contribute to a delivery 
system for weapons of mass destruction, the Government will authorize transfers of 
items in the Annex only on receipt of appropriate assurances from the government 
of the recipient state that:
the items will be used only for the purpose stated and that such use will not be modi!ed 
nor the items modi!ed or replicated without the prior consent of the Government;
Neither the items nor replicas nor derivatives thereof will be re transferred without the 
consent of the Government.”
8 Council Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000 of 22 June 2000 setting up a Community 
regime for the control of exports of dual-use items and technology OJ L 159, 
30.6.2000, p. 1–215.
9 Article 8 of Regulation 1334/2000.
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The wording of the first criterion has been amended to better 
reflect the international ruling of dual-use trade control, which 
consists of a mix of international laws (essentially the three treaties) 
and soft laws (the five dual-use trade control regimes). The text 
has also been amended to formally confirm that criteria listed by 
one of those instruments is obligatory for all Member States only if 
they have all ratified it or are parties to it. In 2000, the 15 Member 
States were all part of the same instruments, so this amendment 
had almost no consequences. 
Since the adoption of the first system, the potential for the 
EU to unilaterally impose sanctions concerning dual-use items 
against a third State has been controversial. If EU treaties seem to 
have empowered the Council, most of its decisions involved the 
implementation of a UNSCR. The new wording of the second cri-
terion has closed the debate by making it possible for the Council to 
adopt only EU grounded dual-use items-related sanctions, since an 
increasing number of countries have been targeted by EU dual-use 
items-related sanctions10. 
In 2008, the EU dual-use trade control system was reviewed 
and the Regulation was amended substantially, but provisions 
relating to the four criteria were not amended11. However, while 
in 2000 the Member States were all parties of the same instru-
ments, in 2008 this was no longer the case. Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Slovenia, Slovakia and Romania were not and are 
still not members of the MTCR, and Cyprus is not a member of 
the Wassenaar Arrangement. Questions have therefore been raised 
regarding how criteria defined by the MTCR and the Wassenaar 
Arrangement should be considered by Member States which are 
not parties to those instruments. According to the Regulation, 
only criteria adopted by instruments to which all Member States 
10 It concerns countries like Iran, Myanmar, Syria, Venezuela and Zimbabwe (see https://
sanctionsmap.eu/#/main).
11 Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 of 5 May 2009 setting up a Community regime 
for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items OJ L 134, 
29.5.2009, p. 1–269.
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are parties are compulsory. As such, in principle, Member States 
not party to the instruments do not have to take such criteria into 
account. However, the scope of the commercial policy, which is an 
exclusive competence of the EU, includes dual-use items. To avoid 
the risk of unfair competition between suppliers, it would be dif-
ficult for Member States which are not parties to the instruments 
to be exempt from considering the MTCR or Wassenaar criteria 
when they are analysing a transfer application for an item listed 
by one of those regimes.
If the set of criteria defined by the EU trade control system 
has remained almost unchanged, the one defined by international 
regimes to which the EU refers has been lightly amended in light 
of the evolution of the international situation. For example, the 
unacceptable risk of diversion to acts of terrorism has been included 
in most trade control regimes after the New York World Trade 
Center Twin Tower terrorist attack in September 2001.
The situation was the same for conditions, as there was no 
consensus between the Council and the Parliament regarding the 
inclusion of trade control conditions in the EU Regulation, and 
the conditions already established by international trade control 
regimes have also been amended in light of the evolution of the 
international situation. An example of this is the condition that the 
transfer of enrichment and reprocessing facilities must be denied if 
the recipient State is not adhering to the NSG Guidelines and has 
not reported to the Security Council of the United Nations that it 
is implementing effective export controls as identified by Security 
Council Resolution 1540.
In 2016, the EU Commission, considering that there was a 
need to upgrade the EU Regulation, tabled a proposal to revise it12. 
While the document does not include conditions to be fulfilled by 
12 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council setting up 
a Union regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering, technical assistance 




the recipient to supply the items, the list of criteria has been partly 
amended and completed. The first group of proposed amendments 
attempts to clarify existing criteria (a, e and f), while the second 
group adds new elements (b, c, and d) to be assessed by Member 
States’ authority.  
The first group concerns: 
 – The need to consider Member States’ individual commitments 
and obligations in international regimes, as well as EU com-
mitments as long as the EU is a member of the Australia Group 
and an observer of the NSG;
 – The commitment not only to consider the eight criteria of 
Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 
2008 defining common rules governing the exports of military 
technology, but also to consider more globally the security of 
Member States and of territories whose external relations are 
the responsibility of a Member State, as well as that of friendly 
and allied countries;
 – The need to consider the intended end use and the risk of 
diversion, but also the risk that the dual-use items will be 
diverted or re-exported under undesirable conditions.
The second group adds new criteria that might be already 
considered by certain Member States’ authorities in the assess-
ment process of a transfer application but were not included in 
the Regulation. It shall be recalled that the EU list of criteria is 
not comprehensive and that Member States have the possibility 
to consider any element they consider suitable. The new criteria 
proposed by the Commission are:
 – The respect for human rights in the country of final destination 
as well as respect by that country of international humanitar-
ian law;
 – The internal situation in the country of final destination – 
competent authorities will not authorise exports that would 
provoke or prolong armed conflicts or aggravate existing ten-
sions or conflicts in the country of final destination;
9
 – The preservation of regional peace, security and stability.
The three criteria are copied/pasted from the list defined by 
Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 
defining common rules governing the control of exports of military 
technology and equipment. If their insertion into the Regulation 
formally commits States’ authorities to assess them in the authori-
sation granting process, this was already the case in the present 
Regulation that referred directly to the Common Position. 
The Commission’s proposal is submitted to the codecision of 
Council and Parliament, and is still under discussion. It is not clear 
when it will be adopted or if the new criteria will remain as they 
stand at the end of the negotiation. 
Over the last decade, criteria and conditions defined by the EU 
trade control system have remained almost identical. Few modifica-
tions have been added, and those that were adopted were essentially 
to reflect the evolution of the international situation. 
This does not mean that the policy followed by Member States 
to grant or deny an authorisation has not evolved. The overly broad 
scope of the criteria and conditions and the possibility for Member 
States to add any element that they consider relevant at the national 
level makes it impossible to identify a common EU policy regarding 
the implementation of the criteria. Moreover, unlike in the case 
of the export of weapons, Member States do not publish dual-use 








University of Barcelona, Spain
1. INTRODUCTION
The definition of any issue subject to regulation appears to be 
one of the first steps necessary to achieve an efficient regulatory 
framework. In international law, however, it is not unusual to 
find concepts that still lack a universally accepted definition. This 
is precisely the case of the notion this chapter deals with: dual-use 
goods. Although this notion is governed by relatively extensive 
international regulation, the lack of consensus when defining it 
entails some of the challenges set out below.
In the absence of a legally complete and homogeneous defini-
tion, which is intrinsically difficult to achieve at present, we should 
not disregard the fact that the different approaches contained in the 
treaties and agreements studied here have managed to be accepted 
by a considerable majority of states that agree on the way of iden-
tifying this type of goods. For this reason, the first section of this 
chapter focuses on the definitions available in the different rules 
and regulations currently in force. The second section, for its part, 
analyses two of the main challenges that specialised regulations must 
face: the growing relevance of intangible goods in the definition 
of dual-use goods, and the ongoing expansion of the limits of the 
notion under study.
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2. DEFINING DUAL$USE GOODS
To date, the international community has been unable to 
agree on an exact definition of the term “dual-use good”, despite 
its relevance from both the commercial and the development angle, 
as well as the non-proliferation and security perspective. In fact, 
specialised books and articles are not particularly engaged with the 
mission of defining dual-use goods per se, in spite of dealing with 
such items with relative assiduity – a situation that, given their 
strategic and industrial importance, seems likely to increase. On 
the contrary, to define these intrinsically complex goods, relevant 
sources generally resort to one of the several dichotomous criteria 
which acknowledge the contrast between what might be referred to 
as positive and negative uses, from the perspective of the maintenance 
of international peace and security. Thus, the lack of a universal 
consensus on how to define dual-use goods does not seem to have 
been an impediment for the different legal instruments to proceed 
to regulate them and for scholars to discuss them. It is therefore 
interesting to contrast the different ways in which this term is 
approached by the diverse international norms and regulations.  
In order to approach the notion of “dual-use good”, we have 
taken into account the most important instruments dealing with 
these items, and we have done so on the basis of current interna-
tional practice and analyses of the various definitions of dual-use 
good in international legal texts. Something that is especially note-
worthy when conducting this analysis is that the term “dual-use 
good” itself appears only in the framework of two export control 
regimes (namely the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group 
and the Wassenaar Arrangement). The remaining sources – that 
is, international treaties, normative acts of international organisa-
tions and soft-law instruments – opt to employ dichotomies, such 
as those that differentiate between civil and military uses or peaceful 
and non-peaceful ends to refer to the dual uses of certain materials. 
This review of the different criteria used in international regulation 
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sheds some light on the evolution that this term has undergone, 
an evolution that is still underway, as is pointed out in the second 
section of the chapter. 
While the most usual dichotomy in conventional norms, when 
speaking of the two possible uses of a given product, is that which 
distinguishes between peaceful and non-peaceful ends, in the doc-
trine, the differentiation between civil and military purposes is 
also very common. Furthermore, due to the changes in the type of 
threats that are occurring in international society, mention should 
also be made of the criterion that distinguishes between benevolent 
and malevolent ends. This last criterion, explained below, must be 
understood as a consequence of the potential use of certain goods by 
non-state actors. These three forms of classifying “dual-use” are the 
most commonly used in the different international non-proliferation 
and arms control regimes. Consequently, and by way of establish-
ing a principle, the notion of “dual-use good” can be delimited in 
relation to two parameters: the intrinsic technical characteristics of 
certain types of goods and the objectives underpinning their two 
possible (opposing) uses.
3. PEACEFUL AND NON $PEACEFUL
In reviewing the relevant international treaties in the field, 
it becomes evident that these legally binding texts require that 
the goods be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. Such a pro-
vision undoubtedly admits that a given item may be diverted or 
“misused” for non-peaceful purposes. This dichotomous criterion, 
which understands duality in terms of peaceful purposes and 
their opposite, is used by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons(NPT)1, the Convention on the Prohibition of 
the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological 
1 Article III.1, NPT.
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(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BTWC)2, 
and the Convention on the Prohibition, Development, Production, 
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction 
(CWC)3. None of these texts mention the term “dual-use good” 
per se; however, they all establish the conditions states must fulfill 
to guarantee that certain items with a potential double application 
are only used for peaceful ends. 
This dichotomy is broad and somewhat vague in practice. 
What is to be understood by non-peaceful? Given the certainty that 
we are dealing with international conventions concerned with the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) - which is 
an obviously non-peaceful purpose - this vagueness and breadth 
of the term must be interpreted in connection with the wording 
of the treaties. Thus, non-peaceful uses shall be understood as any 
use intended to produce such a weapon. Consequently, while on 
the one hand the usefulness of this dichotomy may be called into 
question by its lack of precision, it can be justified and overcome 
by the context in which it is used.  
This meaning of “dual-use” – in terms of peaceful and non-
peaceful – also appears in UN Security Council Resolution 1540, 
which refers to such dual-use items as “related materials”4. The objec-
tive of this Resolution was very clear: to prevent the proliferation 
of WMDs, avoiding, in particular, their eventual use by non-state 
actors. The way in which the Resolution foresees fighting such 
proliferation is by deciding that states should control the transfer 
of the aforementioned “related materials”.
2 Article I, BTWC.
3 Article II.9.a), CWC.
4 Footnotes UNSC Resolution 1540: “materials, equipment and technology covered 
by relevant multilateral treaties and arrangements, or included on national control 
lists, which could be used for the design, development, production or use of nuclear, 
chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery”.
14
4. CIVILIAN AND MILITARY USES
It is worth giving some consideration to the dichotomous cri-
terion that identifies the two contradictory uses of a possible good 
as its civil and military uses, given its widespread use. Because of the 
context in which discussions about dual-use goods originate – in 
the framework of Cold War debates about technology transfers 
between the civil and military realms, where “dual-use” denoted 
a civil application that might be derived from military research5 – 
there are many doctrinal texts6, specific articles7 and even regulations 
and directives that define dual-use goods as those items “that can be 
used for both civil and military purposes”8. Not only the Wassenaar 
Arrangement, but also the EU dual-use goods Regulation uses this 
dichotomy in the first part of its definition when it establishes that 
“dual-use items” shall mean items, including software and technology, 
which can be used for both civil and military purposes, and shall include 
all goods which can be used for both non-explosive uses and assisting 
in any way in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices”9.
5 Malcolm R. Dando, “Did we make a huge mistake over dual use?’, Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists, 2011 https://thebulletin.org/did-we-make-huge-mistake-over-dual-use. 
6 Sibylle Bauer and Ivana Mi"i", “Controls on Security-Related International Transfers’, 
in SIPRI Yearbook 2010: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, ed. 
by SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010), pp. 447–66 (p. 447) Note 1; Katherine Prizeman and Daniel Fiott, “The 
Arms Trade Treaty and the Control of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies: What Can 
the European Union’s Export Control Regime O#er?’, Institute for European Studies, 
IES, Vrije Universiteit Bruseel (VUB), IES Workin (2013), 24, p. 8.
7 Michael D. Beck, “Reforming the Multilateral Export Control Regimes’, The 
Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 7.No. 2 (2000), 91–103 (p. 93); Sibylle Bauer and Mark 
Bromley, “The Dual-Use Export Control Policy Review: Balancing Security, Trade 
and Academic Freedom in a Changing World’, EU Non-Proliferation Consortium 
Non-Proliferation Papers, No. 48 (2016), p. 1; Bruno Gruselle and Perrine Le Meur, 
“Technology Transfers and the Arms Trade Treaty: Issues and Perspectives’, 
Recherches & Documents, La Fondation Pour La Recherche Stratégique, 2012, p. 27.
8 The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use 
goods and technologies, WA-DOC (17) PUB 001 - Public Documents: Volume I. Final 
Declaration and Guidelines, and Procedures, Including the Initial Elements.
9 Council of the EU, Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 of 5 May 2009 setting up 
a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of 
dual-use items, OJ L 134, 29.5.2009, Art. 2.1.
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In spite of just how widespread the system of categorisation 
which identifies dual-use as the dichotomous relation between civil 
and military uses is, this interpretation does not seem altogether 
adequate, especially nowadays. Affirming the civil uses of which 
an item of dual nature is capable as its desired, legitimate and peace-
ful ends, and, on the other hand, attributing its military quality to 
uses whose ends are hostile, illegitimate and unwanted, gives rise to 
confusion, since the word military today encompasses more than 
what it used to represent; and the same is true of the adjective civil. 
The term military is an express reference – direct and unequivocal 
– to the uses that an army could give to the development of certain 
goods and technologies. However, it should not be disregarded that, 
on occasion, the military may have a peaceful purpose and the civil 
a “paramilitary” use, and thus the application of this criterion to 
define the two potential uses of dual-use goods seems rather lim-
ited and inadequate. Hence, this criterion can easily be outdated, 
especially if we consider the increasing role and growing relevance 
of non-state actors in the area of international peace and security.
5. CRITERIA OF INTENTIONALITY
Historically, some export control regimes used the previous 
criterion (i.e. civil vs. military) to define the two potential uses of 
the goods they regulated, addressing in this way the risk of the 
proliferation of arms, weapon systems and war materials in the 
military context. However, since 9/11, a conceptual transition has 
been taking place, and these multilateral regimes have been adopt-
ing measures to address the terrorist threat as well10. With the 
emergence of new non-state groups and criminal associations and 
a greater role for terrorism, the military and civil terminology has 
10 Disposition 1, Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines; Disposition 1, Australia Group 
Guidelines; Disposition I.4, Wassenaar Arrangement; Disposition 3.F, Missile Technology 
Control Regime Guidelines.
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become insufficient, and as a result, a reference to the malevolent 
or benevolent purposes that such actors may give to dual-use goods 
has become necessary. In fact, the incorporation of the criterion of 
intentionality into the definition has been taking place throughout 
these last years. Such a shift enables acts carried out by non-state 
actors and alien to the military forces of a state to be taken into 
account when dealing with the term “dual-use goods”. 
In our opinion, of all the dichotomies studied, the categorisa-
tion that most closely approximates to the essence of dual-use goods 
is that which refers to the intentionality of those that use them. Thus, 
dual-use goods are those that have the potential to produce positive 
or negative effects (the latter being linked to the production and/
or use of WMDs), which will depend on the intentionality of those 
who possess them. However, we are aware of the highly abstract 
character of this definition, which is so essentialist and conceptual 
in nature, that, legally, it is very difficult – if not impossible – to 
regulate. In any case, nonetheless, it grasps the essential idea that the 
dual use of goods subject to international regulation will depend on 
their utilisation, that is, whether they are used for good or for evil.
6. CHALLENGES WHEN DEFINING  
DUAL$USE GOODS
6.1. Tangible and intangible goods and technologies
The notion of “dual-use goods” also includes intangible goods 
or what is known as “technology”. “Technology” is described by the 
multilateral export control arrangements as the specific informa-
tion necessary for the development, production or use of a prod-
uct. The information takes the form of technical data or technical 
assistance11. Thus, software, publications or intangible knowledge 
11 Samuel A. W. Evans, Revising Export Control Lists, (Flemish Peace Institute, 2014), 
p. 3.
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are considered “items” of dual use. This, in turn, leads to changes 
in other concepts, such as the gradual replacement of “export” by 
“transfer”, which seems more appropriate for non-tangible goods.
Technological developments have led to substantial changes 
in export controls, as they have expanded beyond the mere export 
of goods to include the transmission of technology through intan-
gible means (thus referring to the means of transport, export or 
transmission) and transfers of intangible technology (where the 
technology itself is not and has not previously been tangible, such 
as oral transmission, technical assistance or electronic exchanges). 
The speed at which technology is advancing augurs a greater dif-
ficulty in controlling transfers of intangible dual-use goods. Huge 
amounts of data are constantly being transferred through email 
attachments, shared virtual storage facilities, and uploads and down-
loads on electronic platforms. There are also new practices enabled 
by the Internet which could be englobed under the term “cloud 
computing”, which allows files to be stored without the “cloud” 
being geographically located anywhere. Obviously, the traditional 
control function based on physical borders and in situ supervision 
is no longer applicable, which poses an unquestionable challenge 
for all national authorities, from the public officers in charge of 
licensing to the law enforcement agents. Data transferred through 
electronic means is nearly invisible to customers officers, since they 
have historically dealt with tangible items12. Perhaps only those 
authorities that have set out resources for business audits on dual-
use transfer controls consisting in controlling computers and email 
transactions will have a clearer role in the implementation of con-
trols on intangible items. In any case, and regardless of the kind of 
12 Ian Anthony, “The Evolution of Dual-Use Technology Controls: A Historical Perspective’, 
in Technology Transfers and Non-Proliferation. Between Control and Cooperation (New 
York: Routledge, 2014), p. 33.
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storage medium being used to keep and share strategic knowledge, 
it would be advisable to set an information security standard for all 
companies holding controlled technology in an electronic form13.
Some export control regimes have attempted to overcome this 
challenge - the first to cover intangible transfers in their Guidelines 
was the Australia Group, and the Wassenaar Arrangement provides 
us with a definition of “technology” that has come to be reflected 
in a number of national transfer control legislations14 - but for 
the time being, no workable and fully effective solution has been 
found to control transfers of intangible technologies associated 
with physical goods. 
6.2. Expansion of the notion
Without having to go back to the Cold War times in which 
dual-use items started to attract attention in the international arena, 
we have seen that in the last decade this notion has expanded – or 
rather, has been expanded by legislators - in order to include other 
materials, substances and technologies not necessarily connected to 
the proliferation of WMDs. In recent years, the potential “unde-
sired” use given to items with a possible dual nature does not seem 
to be exclusively linked to WMD. Indeed, a debate is underway in 
which those involved are considering regulating as “dual-use goods” 
certain items whose potential negative effects - although unrelated 
to WMD - could end up being detrimental to international peace 
and security, violating legally protected assets on a massive scale. 
Non-conventional dual-use goods – that is, items related to 
WMDs – are regulated by the guidelines of the NSG, the Australia 
Group and the MTCR, as well as by the NPT, the BTWC, the CWC 
and Resolution 1540. However, the Wassenaar Arrangement uses 
the same term to refer to a category of goods that is quite distinct 
13 Ian J. Stewart, Examining Intangible Controls, Project Alpha (London: King’s College, 
2016), p. 16.
14 Quentin Michel, Odette Jankowitsch-Prevor et al., Controlling the Trade of Strategic 
Goods: Sanctions and Penalties (Liège: European Studies Unit – University of Liège, 
2016), p. 74.
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from the meaning employed by the other guidelines. This appears 
to be a relic of the past, when the dual nature of a good did not 
necessarily have to be related to WMDs to be recognised as a dual-
use good. Reopening this door could lead to the emergence of new 
problems, as, indeed, we are beginning to see. What this evolution 
reflects is the criterion of subjectivity that underlies the delimitation 
of the notion of the dual-use good. 
In recent years, an expansion of the notion of “dual-use goods” 
has taken place, and this is worth analysing. Under this broader 
definition of “dual-use goods”, products (besides WMDs) whose 
undesired ends are prejudicial to legally protected values  or interests 
have begun to be identified. Thus, some export control regimes 
already include on their control lists goods that can be linked to 
the production of conventional weapons, to strengthening the 
military capabilities of third states or to facilitating terrorist attacks. 
Technological developments, the shift of the monopoly on strategic 
assets once held by governments to new actors (i.e. industry and 
the private sector), and the changing perception of what constitutes 
a threat are for Ian Anthony the “drivers”, that is to say, the main 
conditioning factors, of the change that is occurring (and that is 
going to occur) in the concept and what it encompasses. Thus, the 
scope of application of the lists of “dual-use goods” of export control 
regimes is being extended to include materials that “are supplied to 
a programme of concern or that has a sensitive end-use – whether or not 
it has been rated as sensitive on the basis of its technical characteristics”15.
An example of this extension of the concept can be found in 
the modification made in 2013 that affected the control lists of the 
Wassenaar Arrangement16. In the periodic updating of the lists of 
this export control regime for conventional weapons and dual-use 
goods and technologies, cyber-surveillance software was included 
for the first time, and since then it has remained a permanent fixture 
15 Ian Anthony, p. 25.
16 The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use 
goods and technologies, WA-LIST (13) 1 - List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies 
and Munitions List, 2013.
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on subsequent revisions of the lists17. Taking its inspiration from 
this amendment to the Wassenaar Arrangement lists, the proposal 
that the European Commission adopted in 2016 to reform the EU 
Dual-Use Goods Regulation included cyber-surveillance technolo-
gies likely to commit serious human rights violations as controlled 
goods. If such a reform were to be approved - it was put on hold, and 
debate must be resumed by the new composition resulting from the 
EU elections in May 2019 - the hitherto unequivocal relationship 
between dual-use goods and means of combat would be broken, to 
encompass goods that have the potential to damage international 
peace and security in a way that differs from traditional WMD18. 
Indeed, by introducing a “human rights” perspective, the recast 
proposal attempted to strengthen the current regime of control of 
trade in dual-use goods, thus seeking to prevent violations caused 
in third countries through the software and strategic technologies 
of European companies19. Specifically, this broadening was aimed 
at including the aforementioned technologies that may be used by 
regimes with a questionable record of respect for fundamental rights, 
or that may pose a threat to international security and Europe’s own 
digital infrastructure. This possibility – the eventual requirement 
of the human rights benchmark – was and will probably always be 
met with reluctance by industry and exporters, due to the poten-
tial disadvantage that these administrative obstacles may entail 
compared to other technology suppliers who would not be forced 
to implement such controls. The stricter the controls, the weaker 
17 The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use 
goods and technologies, WA-LIST (18) 1 - Public Documents: Volume II. List of Dual-
Use Goods and Technologies and Munitions List, 2018, p. 221.
18 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of 
the Council Setting up a Union Regime for the Control of Exports, Transfer, Brokering, 
Technical Assistance and Transit of Dual-Use Items (Recast) - SWD(2016) 315 Final 
(Brussels, 2016), 0295.
19 Mentions of human rights violations, particularly in the context of dual-use export 
control regimes, are not yet relevant or numerous. However, for more on the relationship 
between human rights and export controls, see: Mark Bromley, Export Controls, Human 
Security and Cyber-Surveillance Technology: Examining the Proposed Changes to the 
EU Dual-Use Regulation (Stockholm: SIPRI, 2017).
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the competitiveness of the affected industry. Thus, it is difficult to 
imagine how a stricter export control regime would not be detri-
mental to the competitiveness of technology companies when faced 
with major exporting powers from other countries. In any case, 
that the notion may continue to undergo expansion reflects the fact 
that the initial definition was, in its origins, somewhat imprecise. 
Before concluding this section on the different delimitation 
criteria used to define dual-use goods, it can be said that there could 
still be other dichotomies, such as, for example, one that is more 
ambitious than the aforementioned but which is less in line with 
concrete research schemes, consisting as it does in differentiating 
between constructive and destructive purposes. This distinction is 
essential and, although objections might be raised as regards exactly 
what it means to construct and destroy, its moral connotation is 
clear. Another dichotomy is that which distinguishes between defen-
sive and offensive uses; or, that which differentiates between items 
that can be used in both nuclear and non-nuclear programmes, with 
the obvious limitations that the latter category entails. 
7. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
The notion of “dual-use goods” assembles a whole set of hard-
law regulations, soft-law guidelines, actors and institutions which 
seem to have reached a shared understanding of what dual-use 
items are, despite the lack of a unique and universally accepted 
definition of them.
The analysis of prevailing international practice reveals the 
existence of three main criteria for the delimitation of the notion of 
dual-use goods: peaceful and non-peaceful ends (this terminology 
is used in legally binding rules), civil and military uses (this termi-
nology is found in some export control regimes’ guidelines and in 
specialised doctrine) and benevolent and malevolent purposes (used 
by certain export control regimes in order to be able to address the 
terrorist threat in transfer control systems). The study carried out 
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also shows that all the sources that attempt to define dual-use goods 
do so on the basis of the following premise: they are goods which, 
on the one hand, have certain indisputable and objective technical 
characteristics and, on the other hand, are susceptible of having 
two opposing uses. The fact that the same good could be used for 
one of two opposite purposes leaves it to the free will of the person 
who will use it to decide whether the item will be employed for 
a peaceful, civil or benevolent purpose or, on the contrary, for a 
non-peaceful, military or malevolent purpose. Nonetheless, and in 
spite of all that follows this two-fold premise, different legal sources 
resort to different criteria to describe those two potential uses. In 
this sense, it should be stressed again that in the current context of 
international security, where threats are often posed by non-state 
actors, the criterion that best encompasses the two potential uses 
that may be given to these items is the dichotomy that differentiates 
between benevolent and malevolent ends, although we are aware 
that their marked abstract - and even moral - component makes 
legal regulation particularly difficult. 
It should also be recalled that, as part of the evolution under-
gone by the term “dual-use goods”, two specific factors particularly 
stand out: the inclusion of the increasingly present intangible goods 
as dual-use items that must be subject to control - with all the dif-
ficulties that this implies - and the expansion of the traditional limits 
of the notion to cover certain materials not necessarily linked to 
nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. If the limits of the notion 
continue to be expanded, it will consequently imply new regulatory 
difficulties and new obstacles for actors interested in transferring, 
exporting and benefiting from the industrial side of dual-use goods. 
In such a case, the legislator will have to find a way to strike a new 
balance between the right to development and the obligation to 
control to ensure security.  
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1. INTRODUCTION
This contribution seeks to analyse the content of the EU dual-
use items Regulation 428/20091 with regard to human rights pro-
visions intended to control dual-use goods and technologies that 
might be used to violate human rights.
To this end, the definition of “dual-use items”, as laid out in 
article 2 of Regulation 428/2009, will be considered together with 
the scope of application, as defined in article 3 and including catch-
all clauses provisions (articles 4 and 8) and Annex I. 
Finally, a comparison will be drawn between the scope of 
application of Regulation 428/2009 and the RECAST as proposed 
by the European Commission.2 Although there is very little chance 
that this piece of legislation will ever be adopted as tabled by the 
European Commission, it is still interesting from an analytical per-
spective to note the efforts that have been made in this document 
to bridge the gap between the definition of “dual-use items” and 
the real scope of application.
1 Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 of 5 May 2009 setting up a Community 
regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use 
items, OJ L 134/1 of 29/05/2009, available from: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/
resource.html?uri=cellar:1b8f930e-8648-11e6-b076-01aa75ed71a1.0013.02/
DOC_1&format=PDF.
2 Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL
 setting up a Union regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering, technical 
assistance and transit of dual-use items (recast), Brussels, 28.9.2016 COM(2016) 





The aim of the analysis will be to answer the following ques-
tions: does the scope of application of the EU dual-use Regulation 
match with the definition, and what are the consequences of match-
ing or not matching?
2. THE EMERGENCE OF NEW SECURITY 
THREATS AND THE DUAL$USE DEFINITION 
Through the years, the scope of dual-use items to control has 
increased given the evolution of security threats. In fact, besides the 
classic security threats, such as the non-proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD) in the hands of States and the threat 
of WMD in the hands of terrorists (this last international secu-
rity threat was officially recognised in the UN Security Council 
Resolution 1540 of 28 April 2004 (UNSCR 1540)), new and more 
insidious threats have emerged on the international scene, mainly 
linked to the always evolving “information society”. One of the 
main risks in this sort of society appears to be growing surveillance. 
These new concerns were already recognised by the European 
Commission in the Green Paper issued on 30 June 2011, as estab-
lished by Art. 25 of Regulation 428/2009 requiring the Commission 
to prepare a report on the implementation of the EU trade control 
system and possible areas of reform3. Among the challenges that 
the EU trade control system has to face, the Green Paper recognises 
new threats to security coupled with technological progress leading 
to the increased availability of sensitive items. 
On 17 January 2013, a report on the 2011 Green Paper results 
was published which confirmed and expanded on the challenges 
3 European Commission, “Green Paper: The Dual-use Export Control System of the 
European Union: Ensuring Security and Competitiveness in a Changing World,” 
COM(2011) 393 !nal, Brussels, June 30, 2011. 
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raised by new technologies and technological development4. Among 
the new technologies, transformational technologies and cloud 
computing are cited, while the term “cyber-tools” appears for the 
first time in the Commission’s documents on dual-use trade con-
trol. The connection between international political events, such 
as the Arab Spring, and the need to prevent human rights abuses 
through the export control of telecommunications surveillance 
and internet monitoring systems is, for the first time, brought to 
the attention of the Commission by some Member States, some 
MEPs, civil society organisations and researchers. 
In this context, security threats linked to human rights viola-
tions seem more likely than classical ones, and the need to control 
dual-use items with HR considerations is therefore higher. Article 
2 of Regulation 428/2009 defines dual-use items as: 
(…) items, including software and technology, which can be used 
for both civil and military purposes, and shall include all goods 
which can be used for both non-explosive uses and assisting in 
any way in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices (…).
The definition of dual-use items used by this Regulation 
attempts to mix two different understandings of the term. The first 
considers items that could have military and non-military purposes 
(as for the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Australia Group and the 
Missile Technology Control Regime), and the second includes 
items that could have nuclear and non-nuclear purposes (as for the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group). As it appears, the definition does not 
consider the human rights dimension.
4 European Commission, “Commission Sta# Working Document, Strategic Export 
Controls: Ensuring Security and Competitiveness in a Changing World - A Report 
on the Public Consultation Launched under the Green Paper,” COM(2011) 393, 
SWD(2013) 7 nal, Brussels, January 17, 2013. 
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3. THE SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF THE EU 
DUAL$USE REGULATION
Despite the “crystallised”, although already comprehensive, 
definition of “dual-use items”, the scope of application is wider than 
the definition laid down in article 2, as stated in article 3:
1. An authorisation shall be required for the export of the dual-use 
items listed in Annex I.
2. Pursuant to Article 4 or Article 8, an authorisation may also be 
required for the export to all or certain destinations of certain dual-
use items not listed in Annex I.
Three main elements represent the scope of application as 
indicated in this article: items listed in Annex I, non-listed items 
covered by article 4 and non-listed items covered by article 8. 
Annex I to Regulation 428/2009 is a compilation of the control 
lists of the international export control regimes: the Wassenaar 
Arrangement, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), 
the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Australia Group (AG). 
Each amendment to one of the international export control lists is 
integrated in Annex I by the European Commission, which, follow-
ing Regulation 599/20145, can adopt delegated acts to modify and 
update the lists of items and countries covered by the Regulation. 
Previously, the annual update was done by the Council and the 
European Parliament under the normal legislative procedure (which 
takes around a year).
In this context and with regard to human rights considera-
tions, on 30 December 2014, the Commission Delegated Regulation 
5 European Union, Regulation (EU) No 599/2014 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 16 April 2014 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 setting 
up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of 
dual-use items, OJ L 173/79 of 12/06/2014.
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(EU) No 1382/20146 entered into force, updating Annex I to 
include modifications adopted by export control regimes in 2011, 
2012 and 2013. Among the updates introduced, the Commission 
Delegated Regulation inserted the Wassenaar Arrangement’s 
December 2013 updates, including some “Intrusion Software” and 
“IP Network Surveillance Systems”. In Annex I of the EU Dual-Use 
Regulation, “Intrusion software” falls within Category 4, (Computers 
Systems, Equipment and Components), control entry 4A005, 
while “IP Network Surveillance Systems” fall within Category 5 
(Telecommunications systems, equipment, components and acces-
sories), control entry 5A001. Although these controls were not 
included in the Wassenaar Arrangement on the basis of human 
rights considerations, they paved the way for the control of items 
which might also be used to violate human rights. 
The Regulation establishes the possibility of controlling non-
listed items on the basis of articles 4 and 8. These provisions, called 
“catch-all clauses”, allow the possibility of controlling unlisted items 
for reasons established in the relevant provision. As per article 4, 
items may be controlled if there is a risk of military end-use or a 
WMD-related risk, or if the country of destination is subject to an 
arms embargo. As stated in article 4:
1. An authorisation shall be required for the export of dual-use items 
not listed in Annex I if the exporter has been informed by the com-
petent authorities of the Member State in which he is established 
that the items in question are or may be intended, in their entirety 
or in part, for use in connection with the development, production, 
handling, operation, maintenance, storage, detection, identification 
or dissemination of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices or the development, production, mainte-
nance or storage of missiles capable of delivering such weapons.
6 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 1382/2014 of 22 October 2014 amending 
Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of 
exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items, OJ L 371/1 of 30/12/2014, 
available on: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2014/1382/oj/eng.
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2. An authorisation shall also be required for the export of dual-use 
items not listed in Annex I if the purchasing country or country 
of destination is subject to an arms embargo decided by a common 
position or joint action adopted by the Council or a decision of the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or an 
arms embargo imposed by a binding resolution of the Security Council 
of the United Nations and if the exporter has been informed by the 
authorities referred to in paragraph 1 that the items in question are or 
may be intended, in their entirety or in part, for a military end-use. 
For the purposes of this paragraph, “military end-use” shall mean:
a. incorporation into military items listed in the military list of 
Member States;
b. use of production, test or analytical equipment and components 
therefor, for the development, production or maintenance of mili-
tary items listed in the abovementioned list;
c. use of any unfinished products in a plant for the production of 
military items listed in the abovementioned list.
3. An authorisation shall also be required for the export of dual-use 
items not listed in Annex I if the exporter has been informed by the 
authorities referred to in paragraph 1 that the items in question 
are or may be intended, in their entirety or in part, for use as parts 
or components of military items listed in the national military list 
that have been exported from the territory of that Member State 
without authorisation or in violation of an authorisation prescribed 
by national legislation of that Member State.
4. If an exporter is aware that dual-use items which he proposes to 
export, not listed in Annex I, are intended, in their entirety or in 
part, for any of the uses referred to in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3, he 
must notify the authorities referred to in paragraph 1, which will 
decide whether or not it is expedient to make the export concerned 
subject to authorisation.
5. A Member State may adopt or maintain national legislation impos-
ing an authorisation requirement on the export of dual-use items 
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not listed in Annex I if the exporter has grounds for suspecting that 
those items are or may be intended, in their entirety or in part, for 
any of the uses referred to in paragraph 1.
(…).
During the evolution of Regulation 428/2009, article 4 broad-
ened its scope of application, passing from Council Regulation (EC) 
No 3381/94 of 19 December 19947 to Council Regulation (EC) 
No 1334/2000 of 22 June 20008. In fact, while the first EU dual-
use Regulation only covered unlisted items for misuses related to 
WMD proliferation issues, Council Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000 
broadened the scope by including a risk of military end-use and 
if the country of destination is subject to an arms embargo in the 
present Regulation 428/2009.
As stated in 
Article 8 establishes the possibility of controlling non-listed 
items but for reasons linked to human rights violations. As stated 
in the article:
1. A Member State may prohibit or impose an authorisation require-
ment on the export of dual-use items not listed in Annex I for reasons 
of public security or human rights considerations.
2. Member States shall notify the Commission of any measures adopted 
pursuant to paragraph 1 immediately after their adoption and indi-
cate the precise reasons for the measures. 
(…).
As it appears from the articles above, the implementation of 
catch-all clauses is left to individual Member States, which may 
7 Council Regulation (EC) No 3381/94 of 19 December 1994 setting up a Community 
regime for the control of exports of dual-use goods, O$cial journal of the European 
Union (OJ L 367, 31.12.1994).
8 Council Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000 of 22 June 2000 setting up a Community 
regime for the control of exports of dual-use items and technology, O$cial Journal 
of the European Union, (OJ L 159, 30.06.2000).
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adopt such measures on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, the quantity 
and variety of items which might be controlled through a catch-all 
provision are potentially high and might divert from one Member 
State to another. 
The implications for the implementation of trade controls 
due to human rights concerns cannot be neglected, since the scope 
of the Regulation can be widely expanded through this provision. 
It is interesting to note that although this provision, which 
gives Member States the possibility of controlling items for human 
rights concerns, already existed in the previous EU dual-use regu-
lation (Council Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000 of 22 June 2000), 
it was only used for the first time in 2012 by Italy (published on 
September 19 (C 283/4, 19.9.2012)), when the Italian competent 
authority adopted a catch-all clause against Syria due to public secu-
rity and human rights considerations.
From the brief analysis above, it emerges that although the 
definition of dual-use items does not take into account human 
rights considerations, the scope of application of the EU dual-use 
regulation goes far beyond the definition given in article 2. Indeed, 
both in terms of listed and non-listed items, the scope of controls 
has followed developments going on in the technology and inter-
national security fields. 
Still, a sort of hysteria seems to surround the EU dual-use 
Regulation implemented in two different but parallel dimensions 
following different timeframes. One dimension concerns the defi-
nition of “dual-use items”, which seems stuck in the past, at the 
very origin of international security threats; the other dimension 
is dominated by the scope of application of the regulation, which 
seems more fluid in its implementation as it tries to keep pace with 
developments in the international arena. 
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4. THE RECAST AS AN ATTEMPT 
TO"FILL"THE"GAP
The RECAST, as tabled by the European Commission in 
September 2016, seemed to be an attempt to put an end to this 
“temporal inconsistency” and bridge the definition-scope gap. 
The first element that acknowledges the link between security 
and human rights is a broader definition of “dual-use items”. Indeed, 
the RECAST adds a paragraph to the classical definition in a way 
that includes the human rights dimension:
B. cyber-surveillance technology which can be used for the commission 
of serious violations of human rights or international humanitarian 
law, or can pose a threat to international security or the essential 
security interests of the Union and its Member States.
The scope of catch-all clauses is also broadened by adding the 
possibility of controlling non-listed items for serious violations of 
human rights in situations of armed conflict or internal repression 
in the country of destination:
(…)
D. for use by persons complicit in or responsible for directing or com-
mitting serious violations of human rights or international humani-
tarian law in situations of armed conflict or internal repression 
in the country of final destination, as identified by relevant pub-
lic international institutions, or European or national competent 
authorities, and where there is evidence of the use of this or similar 
items for directing or implementing such serious violations by the 
proposed end-user;
E. for use in connection with acts of terrorism.
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In line with the broadened scope, the amended article 14 adds 
the human rights dimension to the list of control criteria to assess 
when deciding whether or not to grant an authorisation:
1. In deciding whether or not to grant an individual or global export 
authorisation or to grant an authorisation for brokering services or 
technical assistance under this Regulation, the competent authorities 
of the Member States shall take into account:
(…)
B. respect for human rights in the country of final destination as 
well as respect by that country of international humanitarian law;
(…).
Finally, the RECAST introduces more controls on cyber-
surveillance technologies in a newly added second part of Annex I 
(Annex I-B), which allows for autonomous EU controls, independ-
ent of international export control regimes lists updates.
The European Parliament contributed, by a series of amend-
ments proposed to the Commission’s initial proposal, to broadening 
and further clarifying the human rights dimensions in the legislative 
proposal. The draft of the European Parliament’s legislative resolu-
tion, contained in the Draft report of the Committee of International 
Trade9, introduced 57 amendments10 to the Commission’s pro-
posal. Some example of efforts aimed at clarifying the scope are: 
the definition given by the EP to “intrusion software” to stress that 
it may cover both malicious and desirable defensive purposes; the 
limitation of the category of “data retention system” to systems 
9 Dra% report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council setting up a Union regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering, 
technical assistance and transit of dual-use items (recast) (COM(2016)0616 – C8-
0393/2016 – 2016/0295(COD)), Committee on International Trade, Rapporteur: Klaus 
Buchner. Available on the European Parliament o$cial website: https://www.europarl.
europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2017-0390_EN.html.
10 Amendment 13 starts the series of amendments made to articles of the Regulation. 
Previous amendments modify some recitals of the Regulation, in line with amendments 
made to articles. 
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connected with interception systems; and the exclusion of “digital 
forensics” from the scope of the Regulation since there is no clear 
definition of this term yet.
On the side of broadening the scope in relation to human 
rights, one of the parliamentary amendments proposed eliminating 
the limitations on respect of human rights only in cases of armed 
conflict or internal repression. In other words, violations of human 
rights or international humanitarian law would have become a 
reason to control non-listed items, even outside the framework of 
armed conflict or internal repression.
Following the draft report containing amendments pro-
posed by the European Parliament’s Committee on International 
Trade – INTA (rapporteur MEP Klaus Buchner) to the EU dual-
use Regulation Recast11, the EP’s Committee on Foreign Affairs – 
AFET (rapporteur MEP Marietjie Schaake) delivered its own draft 
opinion12. 
The AFET draft opinion includes 26 amendments in total (8 
to the recital and 18 to articles).  
Most of the AFET amendments concern the link between 
human rights and cyber-surveillance technology. For example, the 
AFET report proposes: 
 – to specify which human rights are often violated by means of 
cyber-surveillance technology; 
Text proposed by the Commission - Article 2 – paragraph 1 – 
point 1 – point b
11 Dra% report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council setting up a Union regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering, 
technical assistance and transit of dual-use items (recast) (COM(2016)0616 – C8-
0393/2016 – 2016/0295(COD)), Committee on International Trade, Rapporteur: Klaus 
Buchner. Available on the European Parliament o$cial website: https://www.europarl.
europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2017-0390_EN.html.
12 Dra% opinion of the Committee on Foreign A#airs for the Committee on International 
Trade on the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council amending Regulation (EU) No 230/2014 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing an instrument contributing to stability 
and peace (Rapporteur: Marietjie Schaake), (COM(2016)0447 – C8-0264/2016 – 
2016/0207(COD)).
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B. cyber-surveillance technology which can be used for the 
commission of serious violations of human rights or interna-
tional humanitarian law, or can pose a threat to international 
security or the essential security interests of the Union and 
its Member States;
Text proposed by the AFET
B. cyber-surveillance technology which can be used to directly 
interfere with human rights, including the right to privacy, the 
right to data protection, freedom of speech and freedom of asso-
ciation, or which can be used for the commission of serious 
violations of human rights law or international humanitar-
ian law, or can pose a threat to international security or the 
essential security interests of the Union and its Member 
States;
 – to clarify the definition of “cyber-surveillance technology” by 
adding the dimension of non-authorisation/awareness on the 
side of the owner or administrator of the system; 
Text proposed by the Commission - Article 2 – paragraph 1 – 
point 21 – introductory part
21.  “cyber-surveillance technology” shall mean items specially 
designed to enable the covert intrusion into information 
and telecommunication systems with a view to monitoring, 
extracting, collecting and analysing data and/or incapacitat-
ing or damaging the targeted system. This includes items 
related to the following technology and equipment:
Text proposed by the AFET
21.  “cyber-surveillance technology” shall mean items specially 
designed to enable the covert intrusion into information 
and telecommunication systems with a view to monitoring, 
exfiltrating, collecting and analysing data and/or incapacitat-
ing or damaging the targeted system without the specific, 
informed and unambiguous authorisation of the owner or 
administrator of the systems. This includes items related 
to the following technology and equipment:
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 – to eliminate the adjective “serious” in reference to violations of 
human rights, explaining that human rights violations com-
mitted with dual-use items often will not qualify as serious 
human rights violations; 
Text proposed by the Commission - Article 4 – paragraph 1 – 
point d
D. for use by persons complicit in or responsible for directing 
or committing serious violations of human rights or inter-
national humanitarian law in situations of armed conflict 
or internal repression in the country of final destination, 
as identified by relevant public international institutions, 
or European or national competent authorities, and where 
there is evidence of the use of this or similar items for direct-
ing or implementing such serious violations by the proposed 
end-user;
Text proposed by the AFET
D. for use by persons complicit in or responsible for directing 
or committing violations of international human rights 
law or international humanitarian law in countries where 
serious violations of human rights have been established by 
the competent bodies of the UN, the Council of Europe, the 
Union or national competent authorities, and where there 
is evidence of the use of this or similar items for directing 
or implementing such violations by the proposed end-user;
 – to add the requirement of an end-user statement for authori-
sations for cyber-surveillance technology;
Text proposed by the Commission - Article 10 – paragraph 4 – 
subparagraph 2
Authorisations may be subject, if appropriate, to an end-use 
statement.
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Text proposed by the AFET
Authorisations for cyber-surveillance technology shall be sub-
ject to an end-use statement. Authorisations for other items 
may be subject to an end-use statement if appropriate.
5. LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN THE RECAST 
PROCESS AND WAYS FORWARD
After a very lengthy procedure which lasted for several months 
at the Council level, on 5 June 2019, EU ambassadors agreed on 
the Council’s negotiating position on the Recast13. However, the 
Council’s position differs significantly from the RECAST as pro-
posed by the European Commission, and in particular as amended 
by the European Parliament. Indeed, only a few elements are added 
to the current EU dual-use Regulation, mainly to bring it into line 
with the new Union Customs Code (such as the introduction of 
re-export declaration and exit summary declaration) and clarify the 
definitions of some concepts (e.g. technical assistance and supplier 
of technical assistance, military end-use, ICP, arms embargo, non-
Union dual-use items). 
The only meaningful amendment proposed by the Council 
as regards human rights is the extension of the catch-all provision 
as set out in article 8 (for human rights or public security issues) 
to acts of terrorism. 
13 Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 
setting up a Union regime for the control of exports, brokering, technical assistance, 
transit and transfer of dual-use items (recast) - Mandate for negotiations with the 




1. A Member State may prohibit or impose an authorisation require-
ment on the export of dual-use items not listed in Annex I for reasons 
of public security, including the prevention of acts of terrorism, 
or for human rights considerations.
(…).
Still, it is worth noting that although the scope of application 
of article 8 is broadened to include acts of terrorism, these are not 
defined in the Council’s position and the definition of “terrorist 
acts” as set out in the RECAST proposal is erased in the Council’s 
position.
It appears from the evolution of the ordinary legislative pro-
cedure, its different steps and related issued documents that there 
is no will among Member States to broaden the scope of the EU 
dual-use regulation with the “human security package” and, in doing 
so, to make the burden even heavier for implementers. Indeed, on 
the side of licensing authorities and industries, it would imply a 
considerably higher number of items to control but also a deeper 
analysis with regard to the end-user and the country of destination.
The fact remains that the definition no longer matches the 
scope of application which evolved following major changes in the 
security and information environments.
Although a pragmatic approach is bridging the existing gap by 
means of Annex updates and catch-all clauses, legal certainty will 
have to take over and clearly define what is already contained in 
the regulation. Of course, the possibility of “switching” perspective 
still remains, and the human issue package could be dealt with in 
another context than dual-use trade controls by passing it in the 
so-called EU anti-torture regulation. 
It is clear that a political decision has to be taken on this issue, 
which cannot remain off the “trade controls table” given the out-
standing topicality of the human rights issue in the context of a 
growing information society. 
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As a conclusion cannot be drawn given the “work in progress” 
discussion between the main EU institutions, it might be wise in 
this context to remember Benjamin Franklin’s famous quote, “Those 
who desire to give up freedom in order to gain security will not 
have, nor do they deserve, either one.”
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“Internal Compliance Programme” 
in!the EU dual use export 
control!system from 2009 to 2019
-VIRE/SęEOS[WOE*EęOS[WOE
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Poland
1. INTRODUCTION
During the last decades, national and international regulations 
on export control of dual use technologies have become increasingly 
sophisticated. The scope of the regulations has gradually broadened, 
and more details have been added to their provisions. Examples 
of this include the inclusion of the controls on “catch-all items”, 
brokering and transit, intangible technology transfers, and finally 
the introduction of Internal Compliance Programmes (ICP) for 
the dual use industry. The latter was required due to the complex-
ity of the technologies under control and continuous technologi-
cal development in the 1990s and later on, resulting in a need to 
involve the exporters themselves in the process of controlling the 
trade in sensitive goods. 
As this article will present, since the 1990s the notion of an ICP 
has been included in the documents agreed upon at international 
political fora (like the Wassenaar Arrangement), in national laws 
and in EU law. In some national regulations, the notion of the ICP 
was introduced as early as the late 1980s (as in the case of Japan) and 
the beginning of the 1990s (Germany)1. In the first EU regulations 
1 Tamotsu Aoi, “Historical Background of Export Control Development in Selected 
Countries and Regions”, http://www.cistec.or.jp/english/service/report.html); “Key 
Elements of an E#ective Export Control System”, Institute for Science and International 







on export control established in 19942 and in 20003, there was no 
mention of an ICP or comparable procedures. However, the regu-
lations allowed national authorities to establish additional control 
measures at their discretion if they deemed them necessary. The 
notion of ICP was finally introduced into the EU export control law 
in 2009. As a result, the ICP has become one of the basic notions 
in modern export control regulations even though, in contrast to 
other elements mentioned above, it did not become obligatory in 
most of the jurisdiction.
This article will examine the evolution of the EU’s regula-
tion on ICP during the 2009-2019 period. It will then conclude 
with one national example from an EU Member State – that of 
the Republic of Poland. The case of Poland has been chosen not 
because the author is a Pole, but rather due to the fact that this 
example is unique, as since 2000 the ICP has been obligatory for all 
Polish exporters of dual use goods (although in 2012 this burden 
was significantly reduced). 
2. INTERNAL COMPLIANCE PROGRAMME (ICP) 
% A SHORT EXPLANATION
An ICP provides the first line of control built into a company’s 
structure. By knowing the customer and the specifications and 
potential application of the item in question, its manufacturer is 
well positioned to give the first judgment on the probable civilian 
or military end-use.  
ICP4 is “an arrangement in which a company ensures that it is 
completing legal transactions, obeying the regulations enacted by 
the government, and fulfilling company export policies. Internal 
2 Council Regulation (EC) No. 388/94 and Decision 94/943/CFSP.
3 Council Regulation 1334/2000.
4 “Key Elements of an E#ective Export Control System”, Institute for Science and 
International Security (ISIS), 2003, http://www.exportcontrols.org/key_elements.htm.
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compliance systems typically include a set of procedures that 
company officials must satisfy before an item leaves the company. 
Such procedures include a thorough investigation of the buyer and 
end-user prior to the shipment of a purchased item off-site.” An 
ICP should consist of “operational export compliance policies and 
procedures (…) and a written set of guidelines that captures those 
policies and procedures.” It provides guidelines for employees on 
what should be done before an export takes place and helps docu-
ment what has been done in this regard. An ICP helps to ensure 
that exports are in compliance with export control legislation and 
enables reporting to the government when required or requested. 
Such processes help build trust between companies and government 
agencies. This system should also help companies keep up to date 
with legislation and enable them to know what goods are subject 
to export controls. An ICP should also advise employees on how 
to check a planned transaction in light of any concerns relating to 
the customer and the end use of the good5. 
Detailed guidelines on ICPs for exporters have been provided 
by several national authorities, including the US and Germany6.
3. ICP IN EU LAW IN 2009   
Because the ICP has been considered useful for decreasing 
the risk of incompliance with export control regulations, it was 
introduced into the EU export control law in 2009, although the 
corresponding article was not very demanding. The EU Dual-Use 
5 “Key Elements of an E#ective Export Control System”, Institute for Science and 
International Security (ISIS), 2003, http://www.exportcontrols.org/key_elements.htm.
6 German guidel ines: https://www.bafa.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/
Foreign_Trade/afk_information_leaflet_internal_compliance_programms.pdf?__
blob=publicationFile&v=2. US Guidelines: https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/
documents/pdfs/1641-ecp/!le. 
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Regulation 428/20097, which remains in force, does not explic-
itly require companies to put in place an Internal Compliance 
Programme, nor does it provide a definition of an ICP. However, it 
states that during the authorisation process it is possible to consider 
whether an exporter has “proportionate and adequate” means and 
procedures to ensure compliance. Art. 12.2 of the Regulation lists 
the implementation of an ICP as one of the criteria against which 
an application for a global licence (not an individual one) should be 
assessed by national authorities. The provision says: “when assessing 
an application for a global export authorisation Member States shall take 
into consideration the application by the exporter of proportionate and 
adequate means and procedures to ensure compliance with the provisions 
and objectives of this Regulation and with the terms and conditions of 
the authorisation”. 
Hence, there is no obligation for an exporter applying for 
a global licence to have an ICP. The EU law recommends that 
national authorities take the existence and outline of an ICP (here 
under the notion of “means and procedures”) into consideration as an 
additional criterion in the assessment process, but it is definitely left 
up to the national authorities to decide whether they consider an 
ICP obligatory or not. The provision also underlines that the ICP 
implemented by the exporter needs to be “proportionate and adequate”. 
This should be understood as meaning proportionate and adequate 
to the size of the company and the volume and characteristics of 
its trade in dual use goods. 
It can be said that the ICP was “recommended” by the European 
legislator to be used in national export control systems. It was con-
sidered that its implementation by exporters would increase their 
standing with the authorities by virtue of having high compli-
ance standards, resulting in the decreased risk of proliferation. 
Nevertheless, the ICP has not been made mandatory at the EU level. 
7 Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 of 5 May 2009 setting up a Community regime 
for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items (OJ L 134, 
29.5.2009).
43
The decision as to whether or not to use the ICP as an assessment 
criterion was left with the national authorities of the EU Member 
States. Among them, the situation varied. The approaches taken 
by the EU MS could be divided into 4 general clusters8: a) states 
requiring an ICP for individual licences9; b) states requiring an ICP 
for the use of the national or EU General Export Authorisations10 
or c) when applying for global authorisations11; d) states which do 
not require an ICP but would take its existence into account when 
assessing an application12. 
Moreover, when assessing the EU MS approach to the ICP, 
it should be noted that even though it is not obligatory as part of 
the EU law on export control, it has been successfully introduced 
into EU outreach programmes13. 
4. ICP ON THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA 
2009 $2019
On the international level, the concept of the Internal 
Compliance Programme was also widely discussed at export control-
related fora between 2009 and 2019. After many months of debates, 
in 2011 the Wassenaar Arrangement, which currently comprises 
42 states, agreed on the Best Practices document on the ICP14. Even 
8 Prof. Dr. Quentin Michel, Lia Caponetti, Dr. Ilaria Anna Colussi, “The European Union 
Dual-Use Items Control Regime. Comment of the Legislation article-by-article” June 
2017 (DUV5Rev7).
9 E.g. Bulgaria and Hungary. 
10 Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, Hungary, Romania and Slovenia.
11 Croatia, Finland, Hungary and Germany.
12 Belgium, Ireland, The Netherlands, Sweden.
13 The Author personally delivered lectures on ICP during the subsequent editions of 
the EU P2P Export Control Programme for Dual Use Goods (2011-2016). For more 






though it is not legally binding, it provides an important common 
reference for all the Arrangement’s members (among them EU 
states, Australia, Japan, Russia, South Korea and the USA). The 
Best Practices also help to advertise the ICP among third countries, 
with the aim of encouraging governments to consider introducing 
this policy instrument. The ICP has also been an element of the 
US Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS) 
outreach programmes and of US co-sponsored International Export 
Control Conferences15. As it is engaged in research on non-prolifer-
ation and in EU outreach programmes, the Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute has undertaken several studies on national 
approaches to ICPs16. The Wiesbaden Process dedicated to dialogue 
on export control compliance between regulators and the industry 
naturally included the issue of ICPs in the agenda of its meetings17.
Through briefings and presentations about national approaches 
to the ICP during different outreach activities, nations shared infor-
mation and exchanged experience on their policies, procedures 
or in some cases regulations related to the issue. The inclusion of 
the industry made it possible to broaden the picture and take into 
account their point of view on the advantages and disadvantages 
of the ICP. All these endeavours contributed to raising awareness 
and understanding of the ICP.  
However, it should be noted that the notion of the ICP was 
not included in the UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on 
preventing the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery 
to non-state actors, in particular for terrorist purposes. The reason 
15 https://2009-2017.state.gov/strategictrade/program//index.htm. E.g. The EU- and 
US-sponsored 12th International Export Control Conference in Singapore in 2011 
included ICP as a topic for one of the sessions co-led by the Author.
16 E.g.: a report from 2011 undertaken for SEESAC and UNDP entitled “Internal Compliance 
Programmes”; even though this report was produced in the framework of arms export 
control, it is useful in comparing ICPs implemented in Germany, Poland, Romania, 
Sweden and one private company. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/!les/2016-03/
Internal-Compliance-Programmes.pdf.
17 E.g. during the 2015 edition of the Wiesbaden Conference, a panel dedicated to 
“Discussion of identi!ed e#ective industry compliance practices” took place. Source: 
materials from the conference in the possession of the Author.
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for this may be the fact that the Resolution sets out what nations 
should control (like intangible transfers or catch-all controls), but 
not how exactly they are to do it (e.g. by using an ICP). The notion 
of the ICP with regard to dual use export controls might still be 
too specific for several states that do not experience notable dual 
use transfers. 
5. ICP IN THE COURSE OF THE RECAST OF 
THE EU REGULATION (2014$2019)
An important development regarding the ICP took place in 
the European Union in 2019, when on 30 July 2019 the European 
Commission published its Commission Recommendation (EU) 
2019/1318 on internal compliance programmes for dual-use trade controls 
under Council Regulation (EC) no 428/2009. The “ICP Recommendation” 
is so far the only tangible outcome of the revision process of the EU 
export control law initiated in 201618. This article will discuss the 
ICP Recommendation in more detail in the following paragraphs. 
During the recast process, in the 2016 Proposal for a Regulation, 
the European Commission recommended a full revision of the EU 
export control law. In the resulting draft legislation, the Commission 
proposed that ICP implementation should be a prerequisite for 
using global authorisations and some general authorisations. It 
also proposed a definition of the ICP (art. 2.2219). According to its 
assessment, this step would ensure an EU-wide level playing field 
18 The process began with the 2013 Commission report on the implementation of EU 
Regulation 428/2009. “Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of 
the Council setting up a Union regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering, 
technical assistance and transit of dual-use items (recast)”; http://trade.ec.europa.
eu/doclib/docs/2016/september/tradoc_154976.pdf.
19 “‘internal compliance programme” shall mean e#ective, appropriate and proportionate 
means and procedures (risk based approach), including the development, 
implementation, and adherence to standardised operational compliance policies, 
procedures, standards of conduct, and safeguards, developed by exporters to ensure 
compliance with the provisions and with the terms and conditions of authorisations 
set out in this Regulation”.
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and increase the effectiveness of controls20. This judgment was 
shared by the European Parliament, which in its 2018 Proposal 
accepted the Commission’s text. The EP also aimed to introduce 
the possibility for companies “on a voluntary basis, to have its ICP 
certified free of charge by the competent authorities on the basis of 
a reference ICP established by the Commission, in order to obtain 
incentives in the authorisation process from the national competent 
authorities”21. In November 2019, the review process was still ongo-
ing, being in the phase of interinstitutional negotiations between 
the Parliament and Commission and the Council22.
Important developments with regard to the ICP took place in 
the EU in 2009, though in the field of arms trade. At that time, the 
Directive 2009/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
simplifying terms and conditions of transfers of defence-related products 
within the Community was adopted with the aim of facilitating indus-
trial cooperation in the defence industry in the EU. In general, it 
simplified export procedures among companies involved in long-
term industrial cooperation in the field of the production of military 
equipment. While introducing the possibility of lessening require-
ments for licensing, it also established a standard for certifying the 
recipients of arms. For example, entities wishing to take advantage 
of the general authorisations published by national authorities (art. 
20 Regarding the potential financial and bureaucratic burden on exporters, the 
Commission argued: “the proposal does not provide for exemptions in favour of Small 
and Medium Enterprises (SMEs): due to overriding security reasons, it is imperative 
that SMEs comply with controls. However, the scope of certain provisions which may 
be particularly demanding in terms of human and IT resources has been limited to 
avoid excessive regulatory burden on SMEs. Thus, the requirement for companies 
to implement an e#ective Internal Compliance Programme (ICP) – a set of formal 
measures and procedures ensuring compliance with export controls – mainly applies 
in relation to global licences (and certain general export authorisations), while small 
companies that cannot a#ord to develop a formal ICP can export under most general 
authorisations and/or individual licences. Moreover, the proposal’s simpli!cation of 
licensing procedures and enhanced legal clarity will bring important bene!ts to SMEs”.
21 Recital 14 and art. 2.22 of the proposed Regulation. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
doceo/document/TA-8-2018-0006_EN.html
22 The Council Presidency began negotiations with the European Parliament’s delegation 
on 21 October 2019. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.
html?reference=EPRS_BRI(2016)589832.
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5) need to obtain a certificate that proves their reliability as regards 
their capacity to observe export limitations received under a transfer 
licence. The process of this certification includes checking if the 
company has established an internal compliance system (art. 9). 
The entity must appoint a senior executive as the dedicated officer 
personally responsible for transfers and exports who will ensure 
that the undertaking will take all necessary steps to observe and 
enforce all specific conditions related to the end-use and export. 
Finally, the Directive requires that a certified company provides a 
description of the internal compliance programme or transfer and 
export management system implemented in the undertaking. This 
description shall provide details of the organisational, human and 
technical resources allocated to the management of transfers and 
exports, the chain of responsibility within the undertaking, internal 
audit procedures, awareness-raising and staff training, physical and 
technical security arrangements, record-keeping and traceability of 
transfers and exports. 
In 2011 the Commission published its Recommendation on the 
certification of defence undertakings under Article 9 of Directive 
2009/43/EC23. Its Annex 1 contains a detailed table of “Questions and 
guidelines on the description of internal compliance programmes 
and for subsequent assessment”. The questions guide the reader 
through a practical outline of an ICP (e.g. Are compliance manuals 
being provided and kept up to date for export/transfer control staff?). 
Additionally, examples of best practices are provided (e.g. Compliance 
manuals for the use and guidance of export/transfer control staff should 
be available, at least in electronic version (for instance, on the undertak-
ing’s intranet)). However, no detailed explanation of the ICP itself 
is provided. Rather, the questions in the Annex seem to be useful 
for the assessment process of the ICP itself during the certification 
by national authorities. 
23 !le:///C:/Users/kolakowskai/Downloads/l_01120110115en00620074.pdf.en.pdf.
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6. EU GUIDANCE ON ICP FOR DUAL USE 
TRADE CONTROLS (2019)
A significant improvement came in 2019 with another EU ICP 
guideline, but this time prepared for the benefit of dual use export-
ers. Even though the recast of the EU dual use export Regulation 
was still ongoing, in 2018 the European Commission put forward a 
draft EU Guide on ICPs for consultation with the industry and MS24. 
After the consultation period, in July 2019 the recommendation 
was published as an official Commission document: Commission 
Recommendation (EU) 2019/1318 of 30 July 2019 on internal com-
pliance programmes for dual-use trade controls under Council 
Regulation (EC) no 428/201925.
The objective of the ICP guidance is to provide a non-binding 
document that describes the concept of the ICP and aids the industry 
in implementing such programmes. By being a potential refer-
ence guide on ICPs in the EU, it has a chance of setting a standard 
approach to the issue among the EU MS. Its other important aim 
is to advise the national authorities in EU MS on risk assessment 
in the licensing process.
The Commission’s Recommendation identifies the core ele-
ments of an effective ICP under the EU Dual-Use Regulation. While 
describing these 7 elements, it draws on previous international 
documents and discussions in this regard (e.g. the Wassenaar 
Arrangement Best Practices, EU 2011 Recommendation on ICP 
for arms exporters). These elements are:
1. Top-level management commitment to compliance,
2. Organisational structure, responsibilities and resources,
3. Training and awareness-raising,
4. Transaction screening process and procedures,





6. Recordkeeping and documentation,
7. Physical and information security.
For each of the elements, the Recommendation provides a 
clear, comprehensive explanation of “what is expected” from the 
company26 and how it may be achieved (What are the steps involved?27). 
This approach helps readers to see in practice and understand 
what EU Regulation 428/2009 “wants” from the industry when 
it vaguely states: the “application by the exporter of proportionate and 
adequate means and procedures to ensure compliance with the provisions 
and objectives of this Regulation and with the terms and conditions of 
the authorisation”. 
The comprehensiveness and user-friendly outline of the 
Recommendation makes it useful for practical implementation. 
Moreover, as it was produced by the Commission, the document 
has a chance of drawing the attention of the European industry. 
26 E.g.: “The company has an internal organisational structure that is set down in 
writing (for instance in an organisational chart) and that allows for conducting 
internal compliance controls. It identi!es and appoints the person(s) with the overall 
responsibility to ensure the corporate compliance commitments. Please be aware 
that in some Member States this must be a member of the top-level management.” 
Point 2. of the Guidelines.
27 E.g.: “Determine the number of dual-use trade control sta#, taking into account legal 
and technical aspects which need to be covered. Entrust at least one person in the 
company with the company’s dual-use trade compliance and ensure that an equally 
quali!ed substitute can assume the task in case of absence (such as sickness, holiday 
and so on). Depending on the average volume of orders, this person may only have 
to handle tasks relating to dual-use export control on a part-time basis. “Point 2. of 
the Guidelines.
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7. EXAMPLE OF A NATIONAL APPROACH TO 
THE ICP % THE CASE OF POLAND
7.1. ICP as an obligatory measure between 2000 
and"2012
When it comes to national approaches to Internal Compliance 
Programmes during recent decades, one of the most interesting 
examples has always been that of the Republic of Poland. In Polish 
export control law, the notion of the ICP was introduced in 200028, 
when the previous law from 199729 was amended30. Between 2000 
and 2012, the implementation of an ICP by the exporter was a 
mandatory criterion for all transactions in dual-use or military 
items, and for all types of export licence, be it individual, global 
or general ones31. Moreover, the implementation of an ICP was 
subject to a mandatory ISO-9001 certification procedure under-
taken in each company every 3 years. Additionally, the enterprise 
had to undergo an external audit every 6 months (resulting in 5 
audits during the 3-year period between ICP certifications). If an 
28 The Act of 29 November 2000 on foreign trade in goods, technologies and 
services of strategic importance to the security of the State and to maintaining 
international peace and security http://prawo.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/download.xsp/
WDU20001191250/O/D20001250.pdf. See also Irena Ko&akowska, “Poland” in 
Quentin Michel (ed.), “Sensitive Trade: The Perspective of European States (Non-
Prolifération et Sécurité / Non-Proliferation and Security)”, 2011.
29 Act of 11 December 1997 on Administering of Foreign Trade in Goods and 
Services and on the Arms Trade http://prawo.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/DocDetails.
xsp?id=WDU19971571026. However, the !rst national legislation on dual use export 
control was introduced in 1993 with the Act on the Rules of Special Control of Foreign 
Trade in Goods and Technologies Related to International Agreements and Obligations, 
published in the Journal of Laws (Dziennik Ustaw) No 129 of 24 December 1993.
30 https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/!les/2018-01/poland_2016.pdf.
31 Art. 10.2 and art. 11 of the Act of 29 November 2000 on foreign trade in goods, 
technologies and services of strategic importance to the security of the State and 
to maintaining international peace and security.
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entity wanted to apply for a general licence, it needed to have had 
the ICP in place for the last three years. This approach resulted in 
a very low number of dual use licence applications32.
The Polish Law was rather general regarding the description 
of ICPs. It provided that the exporter “shall establish and implement 
an internal system of control and management of trade in military 
goods” to be able to verify that the exported items are not intended 
for human rights violations, terrorist purposes or other unlawful 
purposes, and do not endanger peace or stability (Art. 10. 2). The 
Law also included a list of the elements of an ICP: “the internal 
control system shall define in particular the tasks of the bodies of 
the enterprise, basic tasks of jobs related to control and manage-
ment of trade, the rules of employee recruitment, data archiving, 
internal control, completion of orders and training” 33. Even though 
the national law provided a general outline of an ICP, it did not 
go into details that would help entities to understand this concept.
In comparison to other EU Member States, but probably also 
globally, as indicated by many export control experts, this demand-
ing approach was extraordinary. Even though some other EU MS 
required an ICP for individual licences (Bulgaria, Hungary34), none 
required ICP certification along with an ISO standard and external 
audits conducted every 6 months. This was a substantial bureaucratic 
and financial burden on the exporters.
32 Irena Ko&akowska, “Poland” in Quentin Michel (ed.), “Sensitive Trade: The Perspective 
of European States (Non-Prolifération et Sécurité / Non-Proliferation and Security)”, 
2011.
33 Art. 11. Ibidem.
34 Prof. Dr. Quentin Michel, Lia Caponetti, Dr. Ilaria Anna Colussi, “The European Union 
Dual-Use Items Control Regime. Comment of the Legislation article-by-article” June 
2017 (DUV5Rev7).
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7.2. 2012 amendment: cancellation of the ICP 
for"DU"goods
A significant change of approach took place in 2012. At that 
time, as a part of the National Reform Programme Europa 2030, 
the Polish government was undertaking an initiative to simplify 
national legislation and reduce the administrative burden35. As a 
result, the requirement for an ICP for all types of licences for trade 
in dual use items was cancelled. Since then, only companies dealing 
with arms exports have needed to have an ICP, and even in their 
case, the number of obligatory audits of the ICP has been decreased 
from 5 to 3 during a 3-year period. 
Nevertheless, according to exporters and representatives of 
the authorities, the current law in Poland with regard to the ICP is 
still overregulated, too costly and not effective. This is due to the 
requirements for an ISO certification and external audits, which are 
costly and time consuming. Accompanying the ongoing discussion 
on the recast of the EU Regulation, further changes to the Polish 
law are being considered, which would enable harmonisation with 
the EU law and the introduction of less restrictive ICP provisions 
for arms exporters36. This could result in the lack of certification of 
ICPs by external actors, with the latter being replaced by a simple 
obligation to register. On the other hand, if it is accepted on the 
EU level, the ICP may once again become an obligation for the dual 
use exports, but only for global licences. Moreover, the national 
authority is considering providing a national standard schematic 
of an ICP. The Commission Recommendation on the ICP may be 
helpful in this regard. As the EU dual use Regulation is still under 
review, the outcome of these deliberations is to be seen in the future.
35 https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/!les/!le_import/nrp_poland_en_0.pdf.
36 Interview with a representative of the Polish export control authority, May 2019.
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8. CONCLUSIONS % THE ICP HAS BECOME 
A"STANDARD, BUT IS NOT AN OBLIGATORY 
REQUIREMENT
After looking at the developments around the concept of the 
Internal Compliance Programme since the 1990s, it can be argued 
that it became a widely recognised element of export control sys-
tems by states exporting dual use items (members of the Wassenaar 
Arrangement), especially those with high volumes of strategic trade 
(Germany, Japan, the US). National authorities responsible for con-
trolling dual use exports consider it an important and useful instru-
ment for decreasing proliferation risks and enabling trading compa-
nies to safely engage in exporting activities. This was proved by the 
adoption by the Wassenaar Arrangement Participating States of the 
Best Practices Guidelines on ICP, but also by the inclusion of the ICP 
in their global outreach activities. The Wassenaar Arrangement’s 
Best Practices provide the notion of the ICP with a firm standing 
as an important element in export control systems. However, it did 
not become an obligation and is not universally applied by nations, 
not even the EU Members. The Wassenaar Arrangement’s Best 
Practices are merely politically binding, and there is no document 
or supranational regulation making an ICP obligatory. It remains 
a national competence to decide on the applicability of the ICP to 
any particular national export control system. 
In the European Union, the ICP has a rather strong posi-
tion. One Member State introduced the notion of an ICP as early 
as the 1990s (Germany), while another made it obligatory for all 
dual use exporters without differentiating between the size of their 
exports (Poland in 2000). About half of them include the ICP in 
their licensing system. In a few states, having an ICP has been 
made an obligation for certain licences, whereas in others it is just 
a recommendation. In the EU export control law, a reference to the 
ICP was introduced in 2009. Since then, the European-level law 
explicitly recommends that national MS authorities include the ICP 
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in their national dual use export systems. However, it is still not 
obligatory, even for general or global license users. This reflects 
the balance between EU MS who have different approaches to the 
ICP. This settlement seems to be a fair solution. The EU general 
recommendation on the ICP enables national authorities, which are 
familiar with their local industry, to decide on the appropriateness 
and the scope of the ICP obligation. If the national authority deems 
it appropriate in their particular case to require an ICP, it would 
find sufficient ground for such a requirement in the EU Regulation 
428/2009. This balance has continued over the last 10 years. It is 
also worth noting an important development in Poland that took 
place in 2012 when, after a period when ICPs were obligatory for 
all dual use exporters, the ICP was erased from the dual use trade. 
This case is an example of stepping back from overregulation. 
In the case of the arms trade, the ICP was introduced in 2009 
as a confidence-building measure in the framework of EU intra-
community arms transfers. It became obligatory for companies 
wishing to take advantage of the simplified control measures (e.g. 
use general licences). Thanks to this development, all EU Member 
States became familiar with the notion of the ICP and its imple-
mentation, even though it concerned only the field of arms exports. 
Another important development in dual use export control, 
though not a game changer, was the introduction of the non-binding 
Commission Recommendation on the ICP in 2019. It provides a 
detailed manual of  Internal Compliance Systems, and should result 
in increasing awareness and familiarity with the ICP. It serves as 
one of the steps within the ongoing process of the recast of the EU 
Regulation 428/2009 aimed at introducing an obligatory ICP for 
companies using global licences. If completed, this would be the 
first time the ICP has been obligatory at the EU level. It would also 
further increase the demand for consulting services on ICPs across 
the EU. With both EU manuals referring to internal compliance 
systems (the 2011 recommendation for intracommunity arms trade 
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and the 2019 recommendation for dual use goods), the national 
authorities now have sufficient material to aid their national enti-
ties in the process of establishing ICPs.
The situation of the ICP in the EU export control system 
reflects the ongoing struggle in the process of establishing export 
control regulations to find the right balance between the need to 
assure industry compliance and the need to not overload the pri-
vate sector. The 2009 EU Regulation on dual use controls enables 
national authorities, which are familiar with their local industry, 
to decide on the appropriateness and the scope of the ICP obliga-
tion. This provides flexibility and allows the level of control to be 
matched with the size of the industry and the scope of its produc-
tion. This situation indicates a balance between a need to assure 
adequate controls and the proportionality of the burden. 
The possible introduction of an EU-level obligation to have an 
ICP for global licences would increase the burden on the industry, 
but it would also assure effective controls in times of significant 
technological development. At the same time, the current European 
Parliament proposal on the dual use Regulation includes caveats 
on the ICP which require it to be proportional, thus preventing 
the risk of overregulation.
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Although international practices in managing international 
commercial transfers seem to make use of similar principles and 
mechanisms, the question can be asked whether a “trade control” 
culture shall be the basis of the applicable norms at national level. 
The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004)2, 
for dual-use items, and the Arms Trade Treaty3, for conventional 
arms, set principles that, despite their general terms, are essentially 
convergent: an obligation of control on certain goods and for certain 
transactions. Often, their implementations follow parallel paths, 
such as the creation of control lists, the insertion of catch-all clauses, 
the listing of criteria, inter-ministerial decision-making processes, 
etc. While they are undoubtedly similar, the question that shall be 
asked is whether these controls should be truly identical. Or, for-
mulated in a different way, if a “comprehensive approach” to trade 
controls is meant to lead to “comprehensive controls”.
An empirical review, based on the observation of national 
systems using dual-use trade management mechanisms for control-
ling other items than dual-use ones, followed by an exploration of 
the assets and drawbacks of “going comprehensive”, will attempt 
to delineate the expectations one might have about this rising trade 
control culture.
1 Senior Researcher, European Studies Unit - University of Liège.
2 Resolution 1540 (2004) adopted by the Security Council of the United Nations at its 
4956th meeting on 28 April 2004.




1. EXAMPLES OF “COMPREHENSIVE 
APPROACHES” TO TRADE CONTROLS AND 
THEIR ROOTS
1.1. Di!erent approaches for enlarging the scope of 
dual-use trade controls
An empirical review of the national systems for controlling 
the trade of dual-use items allows the identification of different 
tendencies in the approaches selected for extending the controls to 
other items. These are presented according to the growing level of 
integration they treat the other-than-dual-use items with.
A first family is characterised by a form of extension of the 
dual-use trade controls to other items not listed in the international-
European single list, which is taken as the reference in the present 
article. Nonetheless, these items are “dual-use” ones, and are con-
trolled independently from the use of “catch-all” provisions. For 
instance, Ukraine adds to the single list, which it uses as its national 
control list, nationally-controlled items it considers as corresponding 
to the definition of dual-use items and inserts these items into the 
list with a specific export control classification number (ECCN)4. 
This is the case for industrial explosives, detonators, and material 
and equipment for their production, numbered 1A906, 1B904 and 
1C913 respectively. The United Arab Emirates have not published 
their control list, but they also use in practice the single list, to which 
they have added armoured vehicles and related equipment. It could 
be said that the countries of this family have only “extended” the 
single list to include more items and, in doing so, have extended 
their definitions of “dual-use” items.
A second family is composed of countries whose dual-use 
trade control systems are characterised by an overarching legisla-
tion covering other-than-dual-use items but making distinctions 
in the regimes applied. Switzerland, for instance, has passed an 
4 Numbering these nationally-controlled items from 901 to 999 in the list. 
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ordinance5 which applies to 4 different lists: “dual-use” in a similar 
meaning to the EU single list (Annex 2), “special military goods” as 
per the meaning of the Munitions List (Annex 3), “strategic goods” 
(Annex 4), and “goods subject to national export control” (Annex 
5)6. However, in the text, the Ordinance assigns different regimes 
to the different types of items. The Law of Georgia7 controls both 
dual-use items, using the single list as the reference, and military 
items, using the Munitions List. Within the Law, different provi-
sions apply to the items depending on the list they belong to, notably 
regarding import, transit and brokering controls. The two types 
of items - military and dual-use - are even more integrated in the 
Belarussian system. The Law on export control8 does not make 
the distinction between the two in principle - and even counts 6 
lists as these ones are individually linked to international control 
regimes, like in Russia - but establishes some exceptions in relation 
to the specificities of the items, such as a differentiation of criteria 
applied in the licensing processes9.
A third family is characterised by the highest level of integra-
tion, as its members merge dual-use trade controls with controls 
on other items. Although the first two families envision a com-
prehensive “approach” to trade controls, this family proposes truly 
comprehensive “controls” comprising, but not limited to, dual-use 
trade controls. Kazakhstan has designed a whole category 10 in the 
single list which it also uses for its controls. This category is meant 
to contain nationally-controlled dual-use goods, which thus belong 
to dual-use “concept-extending” countries, but it also controls the 
5 Ordinance on the Export, Import and Transit of Dual Use Goods, Speci!c Military 
Goods and Strategic Goods (2016).
6 The contents of Annex 2 correspond exactly to those of the European Union’s 
single list, Annex 3 is the Munitions List set up in the framework of the Wassenaar 
Arrangement, Annex 4 is currently empty, and Annex 5 contains weapons excluded 
from controls under the war material legislation, as well as explosives and propellants 
(May 2019).
7 Law of Georgia on the control of Military and Dual-Use Goods (2014).
8 Law on export control (2016).
9 Idem, Article 15.
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transfer of military items with the same legislation10. Azerbaijan has 
made a slightly different choice, as it has inserted the Munitions List 
into the dual-use single list as its category 1011. Norway12, Kosovo13, 
Malaysia14, Singapore15, Australia16 and New Zealand17 apply their 
overarching legislation indistinctly to two lists, a dual-use one and 
a military, which generally18 correspond to the single list and the 
Munitions List respectively. The provisions, and the regimes they 
set forth, do not make any distinction between the related items. 
In the Philippines’ legislation19, the controls apply indistinctly to 
military, dual-use and nationally-controlled items20.
A glance at the systems currently in formation also offers 
interesting, and sometimes contradictory, information about the 
tendencies.
For instance, preliminary discussions between the national 
authorities have led the Government of Burkina Faso to consider 
selecting comprehensive controls on both military and dual-use 
items for the implementation of their international arms transfers 
10 Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan of 21 July 2007 n° 300-III “on export control”, 
Article 3.
11 Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Azerbaijan Republic No. 230 about 
approval of some regulatory legal acts connected to using the Law of the Azerbaijan 
Republic «About export control”.
12 Act of 18 December 1987 relating to Control of the Export of Strategic Goods, Services 
and Technology, Article 1 and Regulations relating to the export of defence-related 
products, dual-use items, technology and services (2013).
13 Law on the Trade of Strategic Goods 2013, Article 7.
14 Strategic Trade Act (2010) Section 9 and Strategic Trade Order (2017).
15 Defence Trade Controls Act 2012 and Defence and Strategic Goods List.
16 Customs and Excise Act 2018 and Strategic Goods List October 2017.
17 Australia and New Zealand have inserted the same additional entries into their 
munitions lists, consisting of 6 extra categories, such as ML909 for “detonators or 
other equipment, other than those speci!ed by ML4 or 1A007, for the initiation of 
“energetic materials” speci!ed by ML908”.
18 The Munitions Lists of Australia and New Zealand both contain 6 additional categories, 
such as a category ML 909 for “detonators or other equipment, other than those 
speci!ed by ML4 or 1A007”.
19 Strategic Trade Management Act (2015), Section 10.
20 However, this list of nationally-controlled items, which is Annex 3 of the National 
Strategic Goods List, does not contain any item currently (May 2019).
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obligations21. However, most of the examples found by the author 
emphasize the opposite trend. Thailand22 and - with the support 
of their outreach partners23 - Lao PDR, Morocco and Tunisia are 
building their control systems by separating the legislation on the 
international transfer of military and dual-use items.
The Balkan countries also offer a first-choice analysis sample, 
as the region has seen a wave of reforms of trade control legislations. 
Kosovo, as presented above, can be classified as a country practic-
ing “comprehensive controls”. North Macedonia, on the contrary, 
has long separated the legal frameworks for dual-use and military 
items24. Interestingly, Albania25, Bosnia26, Montenegro27 and Serbia28, 
which had previously adopted comprehensive approaches or con-
trols, opted for the division of their frameworks in the late 2000s 
and early 2010s in order to separate the two areas of control. The 
case of the Balkans will eventually spark a debate on the objective 
and subjective merits of one or the other option - “going compre-
hensive” or “distinguishing” - but it is also particularly important 
for investigating the origins of such comprehensive approaches 
and their effects on the “dual-use” concept.
21 Information shared by national sources but not supported by speci!c documentation 
(4 June 2019).
22 Thailand is currently finalizing the adoption of its dual-use trade control legal 
framework, the implementation of which is due for January 2020, and which will 
exist beside long-established and speci!c military items’ international transfer control 
legislation (4 June 2019).
23 Notably the European Union Partner-to-Partner and the US Export Control and Border 
Security programmes.
24 Law on export control of dual-use goods and technologies 2005, replaced by the Law 
on export control of dual-use goods and technologies 2012. See Article 5.
25 Law on State import-export control of military goods and dual-use goods and 
technology (2007) replaced by the Law on State international transfer control of 
military goods and dual-use items and technology (2018).
26 Law on control of foreign trade of goods and services of strategic importance for the 
security of Bosnia and Herzegovina (2009) replaced by the Law on control of foreign 
trade in dual-use goods (2016).
27 Law on foreign trade in arms, military equipment and dual-use items (2005) replaced 
by the Law on control of export of dual-use items (2012).
28 Law on foreign trade in arms, military equipment and dual-use items (2005) replaced 
by the Law on export and import of dual-use items (2013).
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1.2. Possible origins and e!ects of the delineation 
of"“dual-use” items
The selection of comprehensive approaches for controlling 
trade beyond dual-use items does not appear to take its roots in 
regional cultures. Even within the European Union (EU), Member 
States like the United Kingdom have made the choice to apply 
essentially – though not exactly - the same control mechanisms to 
dual-use and military items in the national implementing legisla-
tion, in spite of the distinction at the Union level with the specific 
Regulation29. In South-East Asia and in the Balkans, both compre-
hensive and “distinctive” approaches co-exist.
Searching for the origins of “dual-use” items in the absence 
of a critical mass of national transactions in one or the other trade 
proves equally unsatisfactory. It could have been a pragmatic choice 
to avoid increasing the amount of legislative effort for countries 
with limited international trade capacities in either or both dual-
use and military items. However, examples30 such as Montenegro, 
on the one hand, and Australia, on the other hand, show that this 
is not the case.
As for the Balkans specifically, one reason could have been the 
ambition to join the European Union, a condition of which is to 
integrate the acquis communautaire into the national legal framework 
prior to entering. The EU has developed its legislation according to 
the division of competences agreed with the Member States: an EU 
Regulation setting the principles of dual-use trade control, alongside 
more exclusive national legislation concerning military items. One 
explanation, therefore, could be that the candidate countries had to 
follow this division. This is in fact not the case, as nothing prevents 
any State from legally applying the same general control regime 
29 Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 of 5 May 2009 setting up a community regime 
for the controls of export, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items.
30 See for an estimate of the international transfers of strategic items of the country: 
Cristina Versino, Peter Heine, Julie Carrera, Strategic Trade Atlas 2018. Available: 
https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/publication/strategic-trade-atlas-commodity-based-views. 
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to both categories of items. This is the approach adopted by the 
United Kingdom, for instance. As the EU is not competent in this 
area, the strictness of the controls on the transfer of military items 
remains the sole decision of the Member States, and by extension 
of the candidate States. 
Although the EU enlargement may not be a decisive factor, 
geopolitical considerations should not be underestimated. Many of 
the countries with “comprehensive controls” cited above have been 
engaged in cooperation partnerships with one or both of the two 
main international donors in the construction of their trade control 
legal frameworks. While countries in the Balkans, the Caucasus 
and South-East Asia originally elaborated their legislation with 
the technical support of the American Export Control and Border 
Security (EXBS) Program, many countries have also more recently 
received offers of accompaniment from the EU “Partner-to-Partner” 
(P2P) programme. The EU has a distinctive approach and the United 
States a more comprehensive one – though not reaching the level of 
comprehensive controls – for themselves. This might have played 
a conscious or unconscious role in the design of their respective 
offers of support. But, here again, the full explanation cannot be 
found in a sort of imperialism-driven form of assistance as, in fact, 
the EU having no legal competence on arms transfers in principle, 
it statutorily limits the scope of its offer31, and the EXBS program 
has supported the creation or transformation of either distinctive 
or “comprehensive controls” systems. 
Hence, no deterministic factor can be precisely identified to 
explain the mosaic of systems which can be found at the interna-
tional level. Notwithstanding, this diversity produces visible effects 
on the delineation of the “dual-use” concept. The limit between 
what is encompassed by the term “dual-use” and what is not is 
both technically and legally difficult to draw. On the one hand, 
31 The European Union developed a separate outreach programme on the implementation 
of the Arms Trade Treaty. See: Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/915 of 29 May 2017 on 
Union outreach activities in support of the implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty.
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there exists no internationally shared definition that could serve 
as a reference, while Resolution 1540 (2004) itself does not use the 
term, which is used only by trade control regimes. In practice, the 
European definition is widely accepted but it cannot be consid-
ered a standard. On the other hand, the listing of dual-use items 
as a technique is imperfect, as the lists are factually dependent on 
international negotiations where trade and security are balanced 
differently from one participating State to another. The “delineation” 
is the product of both definition and the listing of what is covered 
under the concept “dual-use”. As such, dual-use trade controls as 
they are commonly accepted, as controlling items which can be 
used for weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and 
military goods, even go beyond the scope defined by the “root” 
Resolution 1540 (2004), as this does not cover the latter category. 
The delineation also establishes the room for manoeuvre the States 
have in designing their controls, notably regarding the “catch-all” 
provisions which develop in the space left between the list and the 
definition.
The observations made by considering “comprehensive 
approaches” systems give three indications regarding the delinea-
tion of the “dual-use” concept. The first indication is that countries 
using the same definition of the concept may extend its deline-
ation to more items. For instance, Ukraine, Australia and New 
Zealand have inserted additional items into the list compiling the 
international regimes’ lists. In these specific cases, it is interesting 
to find that explosives and related items are common “add-ons”. 
The second indication is that countries using the same lists may 
also extend its delineation to more items. For instance, even the 
European Union32, which is currently in the process of amending 
its Regulation, envisages extending its definition to include items 
that can be used to jeopardise human security, while it does not 
32 See: Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council setting 
up a union regime for the control of exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit 
and transfer of dual-use items (recast) - mandate for negotiations with the European 
Parliament, 5 June 2019, Annex I.
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intend to integrate more items than those in the international lists, 
not even items used for torture or capital punishment, which it 
controls through a separate legislation. The third indication is that 
a non-negligible proportion of “comprehensive controls” countries 
merge both dual-use and military items’ controls in “strategic trade” 
control systems, where “strategic” shall be understood in the mean-
ing of the World Customs Organization’s Strategic Trade Control 
Enforcement (STCE)33. 
On the basis of these observations, the choice of a compre-
hensive approach for controlling the trade of dual-use and other 
items considered to be strategic or sensitive may be explained by 
a -legitimate – ambition to simplify the controls, or at least their 
legislation, as a single text may designate different authorities and 
procedures for different items. However, the choice of “compre-
hensive controls” is a radical one and challenges the rationale of 
dual-use trade controls as an area obeying its own principles. What 
are the pros and cons, if any, of these “comprehensive controls”?
2. PROS AND CONS OF “COMPREHENSIVE 
CONTROLS”
It is proposed in this section to reflect on the options avail-
able to countries on the basis of the observations made above from 
“distinctive” on the one end, “comprehensive approaches” in the 
middle, to “comprehensive controls” on the other end. Though 
one may not expect from this review of pros and cons to identify 
a universal ideal or factual evidence of the exclusive merit of one 
or the other approach, it is intended to highlight existing trade 
control cultures and, potentially, to provide food for thought for 
the construction of new systems.
33 World Customs Organization, “Strategic Trade Control Enforcement – Implementation 
Guide”: “Strategic goods are weapons of mass destruction (WMD), conventional 
weapons and related items involved in the development, production or use of such 
weapons and their delivery systems”.
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First of all, from a legal perspective, the existence of similarities 
and differences between dual-use and military items’ trade control 
regimes sets the foundations for a doctrinal debate. Within the 
European Union, the division of competences in principle between 
the European level – regulating the trade of dual-use items– and the 
national one – regulating the trade of military items – presumably 
prevents EU countries from adopting comprehensive controls. 
Should they be willing to do so, the Member States would have 
to subject arms trade controls to the principles set forth by the 
strongest legal source in the hierarchy of norms, i.e. the dual-use 
trade Regulation. It does not prevent them from implementing 
comprehensive approaches, however. Furthermore, it must also 
be acknowledged that the dual-use Regulation itself prescribes the 
establishment of bridges in requesting that the criteria set forth in 
the – though non-legislative - Council Common Position 2008/944/
CFSP34 be considered in the dual-use licensing process.
In terms of international legal provisions, one must take note 
of global similarities. An obligation of control based on risk-based 
assessment of the end-use or end-user is foreseen by both Resolution 
1540 (2004) and the Arms Trade Treaty, for instance. In practice, a 
vast majority of countries have effectively translated these require-
ments into prior authorisation obligations. The scope of controls, 
in terms of transactions covered, is slightly different. For military 
items, the Arms Trade Treaty urges the States Parties to control 
the export, import, transit, transhipment and brokering of arms. 
For dual-use items, Resolution 1540 (2004) requests that all States 
control the export, transit, transshipment and services that should 
be understood as including brokering35 and financial services. None 
of these texts, however, prevent the countries from covering more 
transactions, such as import, and the scope of controls may thus 
be similar for both areas. 
34 Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 de!ning common 
rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment.
35 Ibid. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004), Paragraph 3(c).
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Finally, it must be noted that Resolution 1540 (2004) is less 
prescriptive than the Arms Trade Treaty regarding the controls 
themselves. It only contains the principle of these controls, whereas 
the Treaty establishes objective conditions and subjective crite-
ria for the risk-based assessment leading to the authorisation or 
prohibition of the transaction. It is equally true that prohibitions 
in the trade of dual-use items may be found in specific treaties 
outside the Resolution – e.g. the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the 
Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological and Toxins Weapons 
Convention – but these contain only objective conditions for pro-
hibiting the transaction from taking place. Outside the range of 
prohibition cases, the consideration in the authorisation process of 
the factors and implications of a given – non-prohibited – transac-
tion is not governed by these conventions. The Chemical Weapons 
Convention, for instance, merely states that “each State Party 
shall adopt the necessary measures to ensure that the transferred 
chemicals shall only be used for purposes not prohibited under this 
Convention”36, thus leaving the actual definition of subjective crite-
ria for the decision to the States. In leaving this effort of definition 
to the regimes or States themselves, the Resolution appears less 
prescriptive, hence more permissive, than the Arms Trade Treaty. 
More formally, the reflection may be extended to the nature of the 
regulating frames of these specific trades. A consensus, though not 
a universal one, has been reached for framing arms transfers in the 
form of a treaty. Would military and dual-use items-related controls 
be exactly the same, and should we expect a “dual-use items trade 
treaty” or a “strategic trade treaty” in the foreseeable future? 
Furthermore, from a technical perspective, in the sense of 
the implementation of the controls, comprehensive approaches 
offer interesting perspectives of rationalisation. In terms of legal 
architecture, limiting the number of fundamental texts undoubtedly 
36 Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Annex on Implementation and 
Veri!cation, Part VII para. C (schedule 2 chemicals) and Part VII para. C (schedule 3 
chemicals). 
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eases the understanding, and thereby acceptance, of the controls 
by the stakeholders. In terms of institutional setting, however, the 
question may legitimately be asked whether, in the event of com-
prehensive controls, giving decision-making competences for all 
items to one responsible authority only is the most adequate option 
a country might chose. The fact that ministries of defence are in 
charge of controlling the trade of dual-use items or that ministries 
of trade control the trade of military items can only be interpreted 
as signals sent by the States to express their policies vis-à-vis these 
items and the balance that is sought and promoted between trade 
interests and security imperatives. At a minimum, commercial enti-
ties are entitled to interpret them as such. Nevertheless, even for 
comprehensive controls, this first impression may be compensated 
by the effectiveness of inter-ministerial coordination or co-decision 
mechanisms in the licensing procedures.
In the course of the process of control itself, the efficiency of 
comprehensive controls may be questioned. At the stage of techni-
cal identification or classification of the items, they are not funda-
mentally different from the distinctive approach, for instance in 
the sense that the necessary technical expertise cannot be found in 
the hands of one organisation or person only, due to the variety of 
expertise required. At the stage of the assessment of the application, 
the purposes of the control of military items and the control of 
dual-use items are not fundamentally divergent: they are intended 
to evaluate the risk entailed by the end use or end user. It is the 
nature of the item which drives, or should drive, the review in dif-
ferent directions. The misuse of dual-use items must be considered 
in light of its potential, but the misuse of military “single-use” items 
must be considered in light of its likelihood. While a presumption 
of innocence presides - or at least is taken into consideration - in 
the assessment of the control of dual-use items, a presumption 
of guilt drives the assessment of the control of military items. At 
the enforcement stage, further differences are encountered. The 
Harmonised System coding, used by a majority of countries for 
their customs controls and targeting of shipments, facilitates the 
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identification of military items, while it remains difficult to assign 
specific codes to dual-use items because of the originality of the 
“dual-use” characteristics of the goods. As such, at this stage and 
with this information, the risk is asserted for military items, while 
only potential is considered for dual-use ones. Taking this into 
consideration, the STCE shall be seen as a methodological approach 
to the enforcement of the controls of military and dual-use items 
rather than a single mechanism of pre- or post-licensing control.
Finally, from a philosophical perspective, conceptual diver-
gences between the controls of military items and dual-use items can 
be highlighted. In particular, the notion of risk is both an argument 
in favour of and an objection to comprehensive controls. Although 
the occurrence of critical proliferation – and use – of weapons of 
mass destruction37 as a consequence of diverted trade is reduced but 
its impact in terms of casualties is extremely significant, the use of 
weapons transferred is almost certain but its impact is relatively less 
significant. In this regard, all approaches to trade controls, including 
“comprehensive controls”, are equally legitimate and one should 
not envisage “de-controlling” the dual-use items.
Notwithstanding, the question of the liberalisation of the trade 
of dual-use items as a specific form of control is also legitimate. An 
international consensus appears to have been reached for evad-
ing the trade of both dual-use and military items according to the 
free trade principle: the transfers of items under surveillance are 
prohibited unless duly authorised. However, the “how” is debat-
able. The Arms Trade Treaty is prescriptive, whereas Resolution 
1540 (2004) only sets the principle of the controls. In the Balkans, 
the countries that “separated” dual-use and military items-related 
provisions took this opportunity to liberalise controls on the trade 
of dual-use items by suppressing import licensing obligations or 
37 It is worth considering, however, that most of the “dual-use” items listed by the 
international regimes, and notably found in the European single list of controls, are 
not weapons of mass destruction but military-related items.
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maintaining the prior registration obligation for entities trading 
military items only, for instance. Hence, this philosophical choice 
bears very concrete implications for the industry.
The nature of the items and their end uses shall also be studied 
from a societal point of view and analysed. As it is crystal clear that 
military items contribute in no way to the economic or societal 
development of the end-use country, the idea of development is pro-
foundly anchored in the “dual-use” concept. The items concerned, 
consisting of material, equipment or technology, are designed to be, 
or at least can be, used for a greater good for the end-use countries, 
such as the production of goods or access to the most advanced tech-
nologies for feeding innovation. Their potential, which is reinforced 
by the observation that proliferative intents undoubtedly represent 
an extremely minor share of exchanges of dual-use items, makes 
these items contributions to sustainable development, whereas 
military items tend to be their opposite. This is supported by the 
important role taken by civil society in debates about arms trade 
controls: in these cases, it expresses radical opposition in principle to 
transfers. By contrast, it is absent from debates – of which there are 
few, if any, examples - about prohibiting the trade of dual-use items.
Finally, a philosophical output of the study of comprehensive 
controls could lead to a redefinition the scope of these controls. How 
comprehensive should or could the controls be? How large can the 
“strategic trade” be in principle if the States are left to decide what 
is strategic for them and what is not, taking into due consideration 
international economic competition realities? Indeed, the STCE 
acceptance of the scope of strategic trade is only one accepted defini-
tion of the term, and it does not prevent the extension the concept 
in principle. Strategic trade should therefore be considered in light 
of the practices observed, as a snapshot of its time: for instance, in 
respect of the contents of “nationally-controlled” items. Overall and 
in theory, if items can be indifferently controlled because of their 
potential end use, are we likely to see the emergence of “sensitive 
items comprehensive” control systems, encompassing for example 
“torture goods”, sensitive raw material, cultural goods and diamonds?
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The “comprehensive controls” of strategic trade, understood 
here as controlling indifferently dual-use and military items, offer 
both advantages and disadvantages to the countries which have 
opted for this form of controls in comparison with distinctive con-
trols and other comprehensive approaches. Neither from a legal, 
nor from a technical or a philosophical perspective, can a definitive 
argument be found in favour of one or the other approach. Elements 
only, not evidence, can be identified to allow (self-)reflection on 
the existing control systems or those yet to be elaborated.
3. CONCLUSIONS: 
Many countries are merging controls of both dual-use and 
other items - military ones in the first place – in their legal frame-
work, and their numbers may even increase in the future as new 
countries initiate the elaboration of their systems. This is translated 
into different forms of comprehensive approaches – as opposed to 
distinctive approaches - going from sharing the same fundamental 
text to applying the exact same authorization processes to make the 
controls truly “comprehensive”. Beyond practical consequences, 
these comprehensive controls impact the delineation of the “dual-
use” concept itself in questioning the relevance of its own identity. 
Despite the apparent facilitation offered by comprehensive 
controls, legal, technical and philosophical reflections on the con-
cept point at the existence of a specificity of dual-use items and the 
subsequent controls of their trade, which suggests that distinctive 
and other forms of comprehensive approaches to controls remain, 
at a minimum, legitimate.
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National Control Lists  
in Central Asian Countries
/EQWLEX7EKMRFIOSZE
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University of Liège, Belgium
1. INTRODUCTION
The Central Asian region2 is attractive for the analysis of pro-
liferation risks from several points of view, as it is a region whose 
countries have the rich nuclear heritage of the Soviet Union and an 
area with a “beneficial” geographic location. After the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union, Central Asian states were left with its military-
industrial complex, including nuclear reactors, and its elements and 
items. These unexpected challenges required independent govern-
ments to come up with quick and clear-cut solutions for controlling 
items and technologies. At that time, states incorporated the basic 
1 Kamshat Saginbekova is a PhD candidate at the European Studies Unit of the 
University of Liege. 
2 For more details on former Soviet Union countries in the Central Asia region in terms 
of export control and non-proliferation a%er the dissolution of the Soviet Union, see:
-'U.S. Congress, O$ce of Technology Assessment, “Proliferation and the Former Soviet 
Union”, OTA-ISS-605 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing O$ce, September 
1994); 
-'Keith D. Wolfe, “A Work in Progress: The Development of Export Controls in 
Kazakhstan” in Bertsch, Gary K., and Suzette R. Grillot, eds. 1998. Arms on the 
Market: Reducing the Risk of Proliferation in the Former Soviet Union. Routledge, 
New York, London, pp. 115-136; 
-'Dastan Eleukenov and Keith D. Wolfe, “Export Controls in the Republic of Kazakstan” 
in the book “Dangerous weapons, desperate states: Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
and Ukraine”, ed. Gary K. Bertsch and William C.'Potter (New York: Routledge, 1999), 
pp. 88-99; 
-'Cra%, Cassady B, Suzette R Grillot, and Liam Anderson. 2000. “The Dangerous 
Ground: Nonproliferation Export-Control Development in the Southern Tier of the 




principles of the export control system. These days, the significance 
of the system for Central Asian countries is still high because they 
are exporting and importing strategic commodities3.
Furthermore, from a geographic standpoint, Central Asia is 
a sort of connecting link between potential proliferation regions 
(the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, South Asia, China)4 and sup-
plier countries in terms of both legal transfers and transfers of 
illegal goods. From both viewpoints, Central Asia is a region where 
there is a possible proliferation threat. In addition, some border 
conflicts can elevate the risks. That is why strategic trade control, 
its adoption and its effective implementation are vital in Central 
Asia. In turn, if countries intend to have sufficient strategic trade 
control, they should strengthen the national control list to meet 
the challenges of global technology changes and to comply with 
international requirements. 
The initial purpose of this paper is to explore the national 
control lists of Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) as one of the core ele-
ments of strategic trade control. The focus is on the legislative 
framework of the implementation of control lists and the reference 
model of the national control lists. The national lists will be looked 
at more closely by taking a rapid glance at the development level of 
the export control system as a whole in these countries.
3 For countries’ exports and imports of strategic goods as represented in the Strategic 
Trade Atlas, see:
-'Versino, C., P. Heine, J. Carrera. 2018a. Strategic Trade Atlas. Commodity-Based Views;
-'Versino, C., P. Heine, J. Carrera. 2018b. Strategic Trade Atlas. Country-Based Views. 
4 Cra%, Grillot, and Anderson (2000), p.40.
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2. STRATEGIC TRADE CONTROL: 
DETERMINANTS, EFFICIENCY, AND 
ELEMENTS
Strategic trade control5 has different determinants, and each 
of them is crucial. The most important determinants are non-pro-
liferation and security. This includes compliance with international 
obligations, the prohibition of the transit of dangerous materials, 
and others. In this context, the question of the importance of STC 
is axiomatic.
Nevertheless, it is not limited to two determinants. There are 
other significant determinants, such as the increase of controlled 
flows of technology transfer, the growing military significance of 
commercial technologies, the risks of political isolation and eco-
nomic retaliation (hegemonic stability theory)6, the prevention of 
5 What is the term “export control” or “strategic trade control”? This question is still 
open for discussion, and there is currently no consensus among experts. Usually, the 
two terms are used together and interchangeably, but for the more precise attitude 
towards the terminology in the expert community, see Dill, Catherine B., and Ian J. 
Stewart. 2015. “De!ning E#ective Strategic Trade Controls at the National Level’. The 
Strategic Trade Review 1(1): 4–17, available from http://www.str.ulg.ac.be/wp-content/
uploads/2017/11/STR_01.pdf. (Accessed on 29/11/2019). The main di#erence is 
the scope of the “activities, items, and actors concerned” in the case of strategic 
goods. For instance, the Strategic Trade Control Enforcement Implementation Guide 
notes that “the term “Strategic Trade Control” is used rather than “Export Control” 
to recognise the importance of controlling strategic goods in various international 
transactions, including import, export, transit, trans-shipment, other”, available from 
http://www.wcoomd.org/-/media/wco/public/global/pdf/topics/enforcement-and-
compliance/tools-and-instruments/stce-implementation-guide/stce-implementation-
guide_en.pdf?db=web, p. 8. (Accessed on 29/11/2019). Thus, the analysis of the 
experience of di#erent countries and international legislation has shown that there 
is no standard or universally recognised approach to the term “export control.” This 
paper uses “strategic trade control” and its acronym, STC, rather than “export control”. 
However, in references, the original term of the authors is used.
6 “...Hegemonic stability theory portrays international regimes as the result of 
an exceedingly powerful state !nding it in its interest to coerce others into the 
coordinated provision of an international public good, such as export control”, see 
Lipson, Michael. 1999. “The Reincarnation of COCOM: Explaining Post-Cold War Export 
Controls’. Nonproliferation Review 6(2): 33–51.
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shortages of supply, economic success, and so forth7. Furthermore, 
STC should be able to respond to contemporary challenges, such as 
changing technologies and the intangible nature of certain goods. 
As such, the rationale of the STC system is essential on both the 
national (regional) and the global level for supplier-countries of 
strategic goods, and for transit and importing countries.
From the perspective of the efficacy of STC, there is still not 
a precise and conventional definition and set of measures whose 
implementation would enable states to achieve an effective STC 
system. The principal purpose of STC is to control the transfer 
of sensitive items and technologies that might be used to create 
a weapon of mass destruction (WMD). The effectiveness of the 
export control system is defined in a context where other countries 
are prevented from buying materials and components for WMD. 
However, it is difficult to measure how much this occurs. In this 
context, the effectiveness of the export control system can be meas-
7 See:
-'U.S. Congress, O$ce of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks. 1993. OTA-ISC-559 (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing O$ce); 
-'Leigh - Phippard, Helen. 1995. “US Strategic Export Controls and Aid to Britain, 
1949–58’. Diplomacy & Statecra% 6(3): 719–52. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/
abs/10.1080/09592299508405984. (Accessed on 29/11/2019); 
-'Gill, Bates, Kensuke Ebata, and Matthew Stephenson. 1996. “Japan’s Export Control 
Initiatives: Meeting New Nonproliferation Challenges’. The Nonproliferation Review: 
30–42; 
-'Cupitt, Richard T., and Suzette R. Grillot. 1997. “COCOM Is Dead, Long Live COCOM: 
Persistence and Change in Multilateral Security Institutions’. British Journal of 
Political Science 27(3): 361–89; 
-'Rajeswari, P. R. 1999. “Economics of Export Controls: A Study of US Export Control 
Mechanism’. Strategic Analysis 23(7): 1199–1213; 
-'Cupitt, Richard T., Suzette Grillot, and Yuzo Murayama. 2001. “The Determinants of 
Nonproliferation Export Controls: A Membership-Fee Explanation’. The Nonproliferation 
Review: 69–80; 
-'Jones, Scott A. 2004. Current and Future Challenges for Asian Nonproliferation 
Export Controls: A Regional Response. Strategic Studies Institute Home; 
-'Turpen, Elizabeth. 2009. “Achieving Nonproliferation Goals: Moving From Denial to 
Technology Governance’. Policy Analysis Brief (June): 1–8; 
-'Williams, Dominic, and Ian J Stewart. 2016. “The UK’s Enforcement of Dual-Use 
Export’. Strategic Trade Review (March): 297–323; 
-'Seyoum, Belay. 2017. “Export Controls and International Business : A Study with 
Special Emphasis on Dual-Use Export Controls and Their Impact on Firms in the 
US’. 3624.
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ured by the effectiveness of each element of the system. Moreover, 
any missing elements can be considered as a source of the issues 
and weakness of the global network8.
Despite the compulsory requirements of international regimes 
and agreements on the adoption and implementation of STC, there 
are no widely agreed upon or standard elements for realising effec-
tive STCs9. The variety of approaches to the standard elements of 
export control/STC is proven by the literature review. It is beyond 
argument that despite different views on the elements that make up 
STC, there is evidence of the similarity of approaches and the impor-
tance of the elements for issues of global, regional, and national 
safety, stability and peace around the world, non-proliferation, and 
compliance with international agreements. Moreover, the control 
list is one of the core components of the system.
8 See:
-'Beck, Michael David, Richard T. Cupitt, Seema Galhaut, and Scott A. Jones. 2003. To 
Supply Or to Deny: Comparing Nonproliferation Export Controls in Five Key Countries. 
Center for International Trade & Security, The University of Georgia;
-'Dill and Stewart (2015).
9 Dill and Stewart (2015).
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3. STRATEGIC TRADE CONTROLS IN CENTRAL 
ASIAN COUNTRIES
An overall picture of the Central Asian countries’ STCs and 
their development can be drawn base on the results of papers that 
have applied the well-known and frequently used method of assess-
ment of export control systems (the so-called Index method10) and 
the outcomes of the published Peddling Peril Index (PPI)11 report. 
Several papers have used the Index method to analyse Central 
Asian countries12, together with other world countries. The last 
publicly accessible evaluation of export control in Central Asian 
countries was conducted 18 years ago. This means that the current 
situation may be different, and only new, updated assessments under 
10 The idea and explanation of the method of evaluation of the export control system 
and its application were !rst developed by Cassady Cra% and Suzette Grillot with Liam 
Anderson, Mike Beck, Chris Behan, Scott Jones and Keith Wolfe, “Tools and Methods 
for Measuring and Comparing Non-proliferation Export Controls,” A CITS Occasional 
Paper (Athens, GA: University of Georgia, October 1996) and Grillot, Suzette, and 
Cassady Cra%. 1996. “How and Why We Evaluate Systems of Export Control’. The 
Monitor: Nonproliferation, Demilitarization and Arms Control 2(4): 11–15. The method 
has also been described in the Russian language in the Yaderny Kontrol journal 
[Nuclear Control] 4, 24 (Winter, 1996). Later on, Cra% and Grillot analysed the e#ect 
of transparency on export control e#ectiveness based on the same methodology for 
the assessment of export controls, but with a focus on transparency (information 
gathering/sharing) and violations in the United Kingdom, France, Germany and 
the United States. For this, see Cra%, Cassady B., and Suzette R. Grillot. 1999. 
“Transparency and the E#ectiveness of Multilateral Nonproliferation Export Control 
Regimes: Can Wassenaar Work?” Southeastern Political Review 27(2): 281–302. The 
assessment of export control systems has subsequently been undertaken by Bertsch 
and Grillot (1998). This methodology has further been considered as “a research 
protocol” for the more recent studies by Cupitt, Grillot, and Murayama (2001), Beck 
et al. (2003), and Kassenova, Togzhan. 2010. “Strategic Trade Controls in Taiwan’. 
Nonproliferation Review 17(2): 379–401, others.
11 The !rst report was published in 2017 by the Institute for Science and International 
Security Press, with a second, updated edition in 2019. See Albright, David, Sarah 
Burkhard, and Andrea Stricker. 2019. The Peddling Peril Index (PPI): Ranking National 
Strategic Trade Control Systems. The PPI aims to measure the e$cacy of STCs in 
states applying a set of criteria by examining legal acts, the institutional framework 
and their implementation in practice. It permits the identi!cation of national STCs’ 
strengths and weaknesses.
12 See:
-'Bertsch and Grillot (1998);
-'Cupitt, Grillot, and Murayama (2001);
-'Beck et al. (2003).
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the method can provide information for further interpretation. 
Coincidentally, this does not mean that there is no recent analysis 
of STCs, including an assessment of the control list13. The subtask 
of this section is to look back, understand the starting positions 
and find out the current status of the systems.
The completed studies of the first ten years since the countries’ 
independence show that five countries of Central Asia adopted at 
least some elements of the export control system. The analysis by 
the Index method includes ten elements of the system: licensing 
system; regime adherence; training; customs authority; penalties; 
control lists; catch-all clause; bureaucratic process; import/export 
verification; and information gathering/sharing. Additionally, the 
evaluation also considers subparts:14 policy and/or legal founda-
tion, institutions, procedures, and implementation15. The overall 
weighted scores of the countries are presented in Table 1.
13 There are more recent evaluations of Central Asian countries in the form of 
assessments carried out by a donor country regarding a recipient country (between 
countries helping to improve export control systems and countries accepting their 
support in the adoption and evolution of the systems), but these are not in the public 
domain.
14 (1)'policies and/or legal framework – the existence of laws and decrees on export control 
that ensure the legislative framework for controlling strategic goods; (2) institutions 
and procedures – does a country have responsible institutions and procedures for 
the development and implementation of its STC legislation? (3)'implementation – are 
export control policies and procedures actually in use?






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































To obtain a general picture of export controls in the coun-
tries from Table 1, the scores in columns (6), (8) and (10) have 
been brought into compliance with a maximum score of 41.82 (in 
parentheses). It is crucial to emphasise that the rounding of the 
score is very rough, especially in data from 1992-1997 and 2000-
2001, because authors applied 72-item and 93-item questionnaires 
to assess the export control. As such, the comparison is not precise. 
In line with the data, the most developed export control sys-
tem was in Kazakhstan and had strengthened in the period 1992-
2001, before remaining more or less stable over the last five years. 
The highest score can be explained by the aid that Kazakhstan has 
received to develop its export control system16. Uzbekistan improved 
its scores twofold, Turkmenistan maintained its standardised scores 
across the period, and Kyrgyzstan’s scores decreased slightly. The 
lowest score was noted in Tajikistan. 
The subparts’ scores in columns (5), (7) and (9) explicitly 
demonstrate the gap between export control policy and its imple-
mentation. The difference shows that policy adoption alone is not 
enough for the system to be effective; it is the most natural part 
of the process. It is more valuable to build up the institutional 
framework of institutions and procedures and to implement appro-
priately. All Central Asian countries demonstrate a considerable 
difference between the enactment of the law on export control and 
its implementation.
The elements of the export control system have been evaluated 
by state in two papers17. Table 2 represents the scores given to the 
element “Control list” in Central Asian countries. In order to more 
correctly interpret the development status of national control lists 
at that time, scores are given for other elements, such as “Licensing”, 
16 Kazakhstan received aid from the United States for the adoption of the export control 
system and expertise, for instance in the framework of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative 
Threat Reduction Program.
17 Bertsch and Grillot (1998) and Cra%, Grillot, and Anderson (2000).
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“Catch-all”, “Customs”, “Verification” and “Penalties”18. The scores in 
1997 and 2000 are slightly different, the most significant difference 
being the “Penalties” score given to Uzbekistan19. As such, the elements 
of the export controls in Central Asia differed between countries: 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan had the foundation of the system, as they 
had developed “Licensing systems” and a “Control list”. Meanwhile, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan lacked a “Control list”. 
The development of the “Licensing system” can be explained by the 
intention of the countries to control not only strategic goods, but 
also the foreign trade of goods (short-supply and smuggling goods). 
Enforcement procedures were supported mostly by the activity of 
the customs authorities. The percentages of the element “Customs” 
were equal to or higher than 50% in all countries. The “Catch-all” 
element was not developed at all; the “Verification” element aimed 
to verify the issued licences and was most developed in Kazakhstan, 
while the other four countries showed zero development.,
Consequently, the evaluation of these elements indicated the 
lack of most of the necessary elements for the export control system 
(“Control list”, “Catch-all”, “Verification”). Other more or less devel-
oped elements indicated countries’ interest in controlling foreign 
trade in general without focusing strongly on dual-use and related 
items20. In general terms, it depicts the starting point and the develop-
ment level of export controls and control lists almost ten years after 
obtaining independence.
18 The key pillars of the export control system, in general terms, are the Licensing system, 
Control lists, Enforcement and Compliance mechanisms and Industry Outreach. The 
study of control lists does not consider Industry Outreach.
19 As mentioned above, the main reason for this is the di#erent number of items in 
questionnaires and the tools used in the weighting.
20 Bertsch and Grillot (1998). Other alternative explanations of export control 
development in Central Asian countries based on four theoretical approaches are 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































Furthermore, the situation of the Central Asian control systems 
in 2019 (PPI ranks and scores) has changed compared with the posi-
tions in 1992-200121. Two countries, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan22, 
have the highest ratings and have places in the “Green group”. This 
means that both countries have comprehensive legislation cover-
ing the control of conventional weapons and nuclear single- and 
dual-use items23, and have catch-all clauses and transit and tranship-
ment controls. The “Green group” countries have chosen the EU 
dual-use control list and the list of the Wassenaar Arrangement 
as the reference model for their national control lists. Tajikistan 
and Uzbekistan are in the “Light Green group”, which means that 
they have at least adopted List 1 of NPG and control of conven-
tion weapons. Tajikistan has improved its system in terms of its 
position relative to Turkmenistan: in 1997 the two countries had 
almost the same score; in 2000-2001 there was a slight difference; 
and in 2019 their scores differ markedly. Tajikistan has been on 
the rise since 2001: at that time, it had the lowest rating among 
the five countries, while in the 2019 rankings it has overtaken 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Turkmenistan24 had low scores in 
the past and still has the lowest position in the group of Central 
Asian countries in 2019, demonstrating the severe shortfalls in its 
control of dual-use and single-use items.
21 The comparison of the ranks/scores of STCs and their elements/overarching criteria 
in 1997-2001 and 2019 is not accurate because the approach and the methodology 
are di#erent, but some development milestones in can be observed.
22 It is important to emphasise that Kyrgyzstan overtook Kazakhstan in two overarching 
criteria, namely “Legislation” and “Ability to Prevent Proliferation Financing”, in 2019. 
23 At least the NSG Parts 1 and 2 lists or similar lists. The NSG Parts 1 and 2 lists are 
available on https://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/en/news/185-nsg-control-lists-
updated. (Accessed on 29/11/2019).
24 Turkmenistan is in the “Orange group”, which means that its legislation is insu$cient 
and only controls of conventional weapons under ATT.
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4. NATIONAL CONTROL LISTS OF CENTRAL 
ASIAN COUNTRIES
This section seeks to describe and examine the national control 
lists of Central Asian countries under the lens of a reference model 
for the establishment and implementation of national control lists 
and their legislative framework.
In Kazakhstan, the very first control list was established in 
Annexes 1 and 2 of the Regulation25. This list applied the terms 
and definitions of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 
Subsequently, the Decree of the Government (March 12, 1996, N 
298)26 created the control lists for the country27. At that time, the 
national control list did not coincide with international lists28, and 
included several lists:
 – the list of goods exported by permission of the Government 
of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Appendix 2);
 – the list of goods imported with the authorisation of the 
Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Appendix 3);
 – the list of products exported under licences (Appendix 4);
 – the list of products whose import is carried out under licences 
(Appendix 5);
 – the list of goods exported in accordance with the interna-
tional obligations of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Appendix 6). 
Furthermore, the catch-all clause did not exist in the legislation.
The situation then changed in 2000, when the new list of 
products subject to export control was introduced by the Decree of 
25 Regulation on the export and import of nuclear materials, technologies, equipment, 
installations, unique non-nuclear materials, equipment, materials and dual-use 
technologies, sources of radioactive radiation and isotope products, approved by 
Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Kazakhstan, March 9, 1993, N 183.
26 The Decree of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan “About the procedure 
for export and import of goods (works, services) in the Republic of Kazakhstan”, March 
12, 1996, N 298 (has expired by the decree of the Government of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan in June 30, 1997, N 1037).
27 Bertsch and Potter (1999).
28 Bertsch and Grillot (1998), p.'118.
84
the Government (August 18, 2000, N 1282)29. This list was based 
on the EU dual-use control list30 and the Common Military list31, 
but it was not well structured. The amendments to the legislation 
on export control32 added the catch-all clause and import/reimport 
operations. In 2007,  the new Law on Export control was established 
(June 21, 2007, N 300)33, and then in 2008 the updated control 
list was published (February 5, 2008, N 104)34. This control list 
is structured well, and this structure is still in force. The national 
control list consists of 0-9 categories like in the EU list, plus a tenth 
category for items which were not covered by previous categories, 
and the list of the military goods (ML1-ML 22). Each category 
contains five technical groups of dual-use items35.
The updating process of the national control list is not auto-
matically related to the updates of the EU list, but instead is main-
tained permanently. Since 2008, the control list has been updated 
eight times. The latest amendments were on May 14, 2018. In terms 
of ease of public access, the national control list is available from any 
legislative database with detailed information on all amendments. 
The information is available in the official languages of Kazakhstan. 
29 The Decree of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan “On approval of the 
list of products subject to export control in the Republic of Kazakhstan”, August 18, 
2000, N 1282.
30 The EU dual-list is based on four multilateral regimes: the Australia Group, the 
Wassenaar Arrangement, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology 
Control Regime. See the website of the European Commission, available from https://
ec.europa.eu/trade/import-and-export-rules/export-from-eu/dual-use-controls/. 
(Accessed on 12/11/2019).
31 The common Military List of the European Union, adopted by the Council on 18 
February 2019, available from https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=
1552381476643&uri=OJ:JOC_2019_095_R_0001. (Accessed on 12/11/2019).
32 The Law the Republic of Kazakhstan on Export control, November 24, 2000, N 105.
33 The Law the Republic of Kazakhstan on Export control, June 21, 2007, N 300.
34 The Decree of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan “On approval of the 
nomenclature (list) of products subject to export control”, February 5, 2008, N 104.
35 A'–'equipment, components and components; B – production and testing equipment; 
C – materials; D – so%ware; E – technology. The technical group refers to multilateral 
and unilateral export control regimes: 000-099 – WA; 100-199'–'MTCR; 200-299 – 
NSG; 300-399 – AG; 400-499 – CWC; 500-899 – reserve; 900-999 – One-way product 
listings controlled within the framework of national security.
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In Kyrgyzstan, the legal basis for non-proliferation export 
control and the national control list is provided by two Decrees of 
the Government (March 19, 1993, N 121 and February 6, 1996, N 
56)36. The Decree of 1993 included the list of raw materials, mate-
rials, equipment, technologies and services that are used to create 
WMD and missile delivery vehicles (as well as those with a dual 
purpose). The list was concise and did not have any classifications, 
apart from the classification of bacteria and toxins. The next Decree 
in 1996 had amendments and contained the Regulation on the 
procedure for the export and import of goods (works and services) 
(Appendix 1). It also comprised four different lists:
- the list of goods exported by permission of the Government 
of the Kyrgyz Republic (Appendix 2);
- the list of strategically important goods, whose export con-
tracts are registered (for accounting) (Appendix 3);
- the lists of goods (works and services) whose import is car-
ried out by permission of the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic 
(Appendix 4);
- the lists of goods exported under international obligations 
(Appendix 5).
The lists were structured to show the name of the good and 
its Foreign Economic Activity Commodity Nomenclature, FEACN. 
Despite these efforts, the composition of the control list failed37. In 
2003, the country embarked on a new stage of the improvement 
36 The Decree of the Government of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan “On issues of export 
control of raw materials, equipment, technology and services, custom to create 
weapons of mass destruction and missile delivery vehicles” (March 19, 1993, N 121) 
and the Decree of the Government of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan ”About the procedure 
for export and import of goods (works and services) in the territory of the Kyrgyz 
Republic” (February 6, 1996, N 56).
37 Cra%, Grillot, and Anderson (2000).
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of its export control system and four38 legal acts were established, 
including a national control list. Furthermore, the catch-all mecha-
nism was included in the extended explanation.
The national control list is similar to the EU dual-use control 
list in terms of content, but has a different approach to applying 
codes and structure. Its structure includes information about cus-
tom codes (FEACN of the Eurasian Economic Union39), notes and 
terms with explanations in every list. The list has six detailed lists: 
- the list of pathogens of human, animal and plant diseases, 
pathogens, genetically modified microorganisms, toxins, equipment 
and technologies;
- the list of chemicals, equipment and technologies that can 
be used to create chemical weapons;
- the list of nuclear materials, equipment, unique non-nuclear 
materials and related technologies;
- the list of dual-use equipment and associated materials and 
technologies used for nuclear purposes;
- the list of equipment, materials and technologies that can be 
used to create missile weapons;
- the list of dual-use goods and technologies subject to export 
control that can be used to develop weapons and military equipment.
The latest amendment of the national control list took place in 
September 2017. The list is not updated automatically; it is usually 
updated according to changes in the control lists of international 
export control regimes. The legislation on export control must 
38 (1)'the Law of the Kyrgyz Republic “On Export Control”, January 23, 2003, N 30; 
(2)'the Decree of the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic “On the Approval of the 
National Control List of the Kyrgyz Republic of Controlled Products”, April 2, 2014, 
N 197; (3)'the Decree of the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic “On measures to 
introduce a national export control system in the Kyrgyz Republic”, May 4, 2004, N 
330; (4)'the Decree of the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic “On Further Measures 
to Improve the National Export Control System in the Kyrgyz Republic”, October 27, 
2010, N 257.
39 It is also essential to remember the Eurasian Economic Union (Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan), which supposes the unity of participation of the member states in 
international agreements and control regimes, the uni!cation of countries’ legislation, 
and the creation a single legal framework as well as the uni!ed control list.
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be updated at least once within two years since its last update. 
The national list is publicly available in two languages without any 
obstacles: Kyrgyz and Russian.
Tajikistan has made several attempts to establish an export 
control system, and tried to adopt decrees on the critical goods 
(aluminium and cotton). Furthermore, it initiated a draft law on 
procedures for controlling chemical substances and technologies, but 
by the end of 1997 the law had not been enacted40. In 1997, the Law 
on State control (December 13, 1997, N 521) was implemented,41 
which means that in this period the state had a control list. The 
list of goods (works, services) whose export, import and transit is 
carried out by the decision of the Government42 probably contained 
items related to dual use. 
Finally, a separate law on export control in the country was 
passed in 201443 and updated in 201744. The law includes information 
about the approval of the list of controlled goods, technologies and 
software by the Government. None of the information on the list 
is publicly available; it requires authorisation in a database of legal 
acts. It is probably available in the Tajik language in full format. 
Turkmenistan has built up legislation directed towards the 
control of general export rather than the control of the export of 
strategic goods. In July 1992, the country approved the Decree on 
the prohibition of the export and import of “arms and ammuni-
tion, explosives, nuclear materials, and machinery and equipment 
for producing armaments”, but without providing any detailed 
information. In November 1994, a presidential decree provided 
the list of goods for licensing for export purposes, although this 
40 Bertsch and Grillot (1998) and Cra%, Grillot, and Anderson (2000).
41 The Law of the Republic of Tajikistan “On state control over the export of arms, 
military equipment and dual-use”, December 13, 1997, N 521. This was superseded 
by the Law of the Republic of Tajikistan, December 31, 2014, N 1168.
42 The Decree of the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan “On measures to improve 
foreign economic activity in the Republic of Tajikistan”, July 16, 2012, N 367.
43 The Law of the Republic of Tajikistan on Export Control, December 31, 2014, N 1168.
44 The Law of the Republic of Tajikistan on Export Control, February 24, 2017, N 1392.
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list did not include any reference to strategic commodities and 
technologies. Until 1998, it was not included in the adoption of 
the national control list45.
Furthermore, Article 20 on “Export control”46 states that “the 
list of objects of foreign economic activity subject to export control, 
as well as the procedure for their export or transit, shall be estab-
lished by the Cabinet of Ministers of Turkmenistan”. This means 
that in Turkmenistan, there is no separate the law on export control. 
Furthermore, there is no information on the national control list 
in the public domain. 
In Uzbekistan47, the legal framework on export control is 
grounded in decrees from April 1994, July 199548 and March 1996. 
Only the second decree covered strategic goods; it included:
 – Appendix 4 on specific goods whose export and import are 
carried out under licences issued by the Ministry of Foreign 
Economic Relations of the Republic of Uzbekistan on the 
basis of orders from the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic 
of Uzbekistan (armament and military equipment, particular 
components for their production, uranium and other radioac-
tive substances, products from these substances, waste from 
radioactive substances, and instruments and equipment using 
radioactive substances);
 – Appendix 6 on specific goods (works, services) whose export 
and import is carried out under permits issued by authorised 
bodies of the Republic of Uzbekistan (export of research results, 
know-how, inventions);
45 Bertsch and Grillot (1998).
46 The Law of the Republic of Turkmenistan on Foreign Economic Activity, August 16, 
2014, N 103-V.
47 Bertsch and Grillot (1998) and Cra%, Grillot, and Anderson (2000).
48 The Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan “About measures 
for further liberalisation and improvement of foreign economic activity”, July 25, 1995, 
N 287 (expired March 31, 1998).
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 – Appendix 8 on items prohibited for transit through the terri-
tory of the Republic of Uzbekistan (items of weapons, ammuni-
tion and military equipment, machines and machines intended 
for the manufacture of weapons, ammunition and aircraft).
In 2004, Uzbekistan enacted the Law on Export control (August 
26, 2004, N 658-II), with the latest amendment in 2017. The legal 
document provides the framework of the export control system, but 
the Law does not make any reference to the national control list. It 
is approved by information from the National database of legisla-
tion of the Republic of Uzbekistan49, particularly by the National 
Action Plan of the Republic of Uzbekistan on the implementation of 
international documents in the field of providing chemical, biologi-
cal, radiological and nuclear safety measures for 2018-202150. The 
National Plan features item 12 on the “Development of a national 
list of dual-use goods and technologies” as part of the coopera-
tion with the Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) 
Program. The period of implementation is 2018-2019. At this time, 
Uzbekistan has no national control list. According to information in 
the news, a national list of dual-use goods and technologies that can 
be used in both civil and military fields will probably be developed 
in Uzbekistan by the end of 2020.
5. CONCLUSION
The national control lists of Central Asian countries all have 
their features and trends in development. In general, each country 
of the region should continue to improve its national list, as these 
lists are essential for national and regional security. The current 
status of the lists indicates the potential for this improvement. 
49 The database is available from http://lex.uz. (Accessed on 12/11/2019).
50 The Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan, November 27, 
2018, N 968.
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In terms of reference models, Kazakhstan’s national list is 
based on the EU dual-use control list, while Kyrgyzstan’s list has 
similarities with the EU list. Tajikistan has no information on the 
national control list in the public domain, but the list and the infor-
mation do exist. Turkmenistan has severe deficiencies in terms of 
its control list, while Uzbekistan still does not have a national list.
